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INTRODUCTION
How to create a nation, how to carry out the modernization process,
how to uplift backward people, how to bring in the millions of illitrate,
traditional people in the main stream of national life--these are some of
the problems which are now baffling the scholars and the leaders of the
developing world.
The countries of Africa and A.sia are often characterized by a high
percentage of illiteracy, a low per capita income, a lack of industriali-
zation and a dependence on subsistence farming, with most of the popula-
tion living in the villages and in the rural areas. The societies of
these countries abound with superstitions and traditionalism—where
loyalties to the family, group, casta, area or province are stronger
than to the. nation and where resistance to change is quite strong. 1
These are some of the factors which directly or indirectly slow down the
modernization process in the developing world.
An important aspect of the modernization process in the developing
countries is the establishment of a society in which there is identifi-
cation of the people with the history, myths and territory of the national
state, and in which social units like tribe, caste and village become
secondary to the nation in the people's loyalty. In short, the
Edward Shils, Pol itica l Development in the New States (The Hague:
Mouton and Company, 1966) pp. 31-32.
modernization process helps to undermine traditionalism in these coun-
2
t r i.e s
.
Various methods and models have been used and are being used to
facilitate and hasten modernization. Quite often, ideology has also
been pressed into service by the national leaders to aid the moderni-
zation process. Three models of modernization in the developing countries
have gained prominence.
One. model is symbolized by dictorial revoluntionary regimes such as
that of Nasser in Egypt or 3oumedienne in Algeria—where there is only
one political party which exists primarily to carry out the policies and
wishes of the "Rais" or the boss. The second model often reflected in
the developing world is that of mass mobilization, such as in Tanzania-
in which the political party is more democratic and open for the masses
to participate in, and where, in fact, every effort is made to broaden
membership and active mass participation. The third model is the bureau-
cratic one, in which the military, after having gained power by way of a
coup detat, combines its talents with the civilian bureaucracy to carry
out the modernization process.
Pakistan under Ayub Khan, is a fair example of this last model, and
this paper is a case study of that regime's effort to carry out the
modernization process in the rural areas of one of Pakistan's two
^Claude Welch, ed. , Politica l Modernization (Belmont: Wadsworth
Publishing Company, 1967) p. 2. For discussion on modernization and
political development, see: David Apter, The Pol it ics of Modernization
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965); Lucian Pye , Aspects
of Pol it leal Development (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966);
Lucian Pye, Comm u n i c a t ion an d Political Development (Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press, 1953); Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba, eds. , Political
Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1965); James Coleman, ed. , Education and Political Development (Princeton:
University Press, 1965); Joseph LaPalombara , ed. , Bureaucracy and Politi -
cal Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).
provinces—East Pakistan. Soon after coming to power, President Ayub
Khan instituted a scheme of "Basic Democracies", which originally was
designed to meet the "felt needs" of the people. The Basic Democracies
later became the foundation of Pakistan's political system until March
1969, when a new Martial Law regime took over which has since raised
speculation about the future of the Basic Democracies System.
In this paper, an attempt is made to examine the role of Basic
Deomcracy Councils as modernizing agents in rural East Pakistan. Speci-
fically, I appraise the response of Basic Democracy Councils to the
problems of agricultural development in East Pakistan. Agriculture is
not only a profession but a way of life for the millions of people in
East Pakistan (and for that matter for the overwhelming majority of
people in the developing world). This way of life is very static and
traditional. In it may be found the seeds of superstition, ignorance,
fatalism and opposition to change.
It follows, therefore, that by seeking a change in the old methods
of agriculture, one is also seeking to change the static way of life, and,
consequently, to undermine the traditional way of life. By making it
possible for the people to participate in the government's development
programs and by bringing the masses closer to government officials, the
people can be made aware of their nationhood.
East Pakistan, with its 55,000 square miles and 66 million people
out of Pakistan's 120 million population—offers a fertile ground for
a scholarly inquiry. East Pakistan is one thousand miles away from
Pakistan's political power base. It has tremendous population and agri-
culture problems. Ninety percent of East Pakistan's population is in the
rural areas. Unlike in West Pakistan, a rural development academy at
Comilla in East Pakistan has engaged in extensive experimentation and
research, the findings of which are available to scholars. Hence, East
Pakistan is eminently researchable for the purposes of this paper.
East Pakistan, is a vast alluvial plain, a delta region of Ganges
and Brahamputra rivers. It receives one of the highest rates of rainfall
in the world, an average of 60 inches a year. People in East Pakistan
are predominantly rice eaters, and three crops of rice are raised in a
year—locally known as "Amman" in winter, "Aus" in summer, and "3oro" in
3the sprung season.
East Pakistan is a land of extreme poverty; the per capita income
per year is around $50.
For administrative purposes the province of 3ast Pakistan is divided
into four divisions, seventeen districts, fifty-four subdivisions, 411
thanas
,
and 4000 unions (each union is made up of 15-20 villages). Under
the 1962 Constitution, the head of the province was a governor appointed
J is'afis 4hmad
,
An Economic Geography of vast Pakistan (London: Oxford
University Press, 1966) p. 2.
Nural Islam, ed.
,
:vast Pakistan Annual 1965 - 1967 (Ghittagong: Tem-
pest Publications, 1967) p. 47.
Mary Beech, Laurwin Corvin, Peter Bertocci, "Introducing the vast
Bengali village" in Mary Beech, Laurwin Corwin, Peter Bertocci et al.,
Inside the East Pakistan Village (East Lansing: Michigan State University
Press, reprint Series No. 2, 1965-1966, memeo) p. 2.
On March 25th, 1969, the Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan's army,
General Yahya Khan, took over the government from President Ayub Khan
who had resigned. Since then, the country has been under martial law.
General Yahya Khan abrogated the Constitution of 1962, but later partially
restored it. Most of the research for this paper was done in the Summer
of 1968. At that time, there was little indication of the events that
unfolded in the fall of 196S and subsequently which led to the current
martial law regime. The martial law government of Yahya 'Chan has not
moved to abolish the Basic Democracy Councils in the rural areas of
Pakistan at the time of this writing.
by the President; the governor was assisted by a governor's council of
ministers. There was a provincial assembly, too, which had a little
power; it functioned, more or less, to legitimize the actions of the
government, and worked as a sounding board for the regime.
This paper is divided into six chapters, the first of which traces
the historic evolution of local government in what is now East Pakistan;
the second chapter discusses the agricultural conditions in Sast Pakistan;
the third relates agricultural development to the basic democracy councils;
and the fourth chapter deals with the rural works program. The fifth
chapter is concerned with the new methods of agricultural development.
The last chapter summarizes the findings and conclusions of this paper.
CHAPTER I
VILLAGES THROUGH THE AGES
Village councils or panchayats in some form or other have existed in
the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent since time immemorial. Even today the
panchayats exist in India, renovated and modernized and given proper place
in the Indian constitution. These village panchayats and villages, how-
ever, had started to decay with the advent of Muslim rule in India, which
started in the 12th century. During the long Muslim rule, villages of
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India were neglected and left to themselves. But if early Muslim sultans,
forgot about the Indian villages, Mughul emperors (15 A.D.-18 A.D.) did
very little about the welfare of the villages. To be sure, the Mughuls
had an elaborate administrative system, but that was mostly for collec-
3tion of taxes and maintenance of law and order.
By the time the British gained ascendency in the 18th century in
India and Bengal, the villages of India had become more isolated than
ever before. The Indian countryside was in shambles. The few existing
For discussion on ancient panchayats, see: H. D. Malviya , Village
Panchayats in India (New Delhi: All India Congress Committee, 1956). For
modern panchayats, see: Hugh Tinker, "The Village in the Framework of
Development", in Ralph Braibanti and Joseph Spangler, eds. , Administration
and Economic Development in India (Durham: Duke University Press, 1963).
Also, see: Norman Palmer, "Experiments in Democratic Decentralization",
The Indian Political Science Review
,
(Oct. 1966-March 1967), pp. 55-57.
2A. B. M. Habibullah, The Foundation of Muslim Rule in India (Allah
Abad: Central Book Depot., 1.961), p. 316.
-*Hugh Tinker, The_ Foundation s of Local Self Government in India,
Pakistan and Burma (London: The University of London, Althone Press,
1954), p. 19.
Mughul trunk roads had decayed because of lack of maintenance and care.
Furthermore, law and order had broken down; thugs and robbers roamed
freely looting and victimizing the village folks. Panchayats still
existed, but only in name; they did not serve any useful purpose. Later
on, these panchayats did not represent the villagers, but identified
themselves with the government of the day. By the Act of Permanent
Settlement of 1793, the British appointed the Bengal zamindars (land
owners) to collect taxes, maintain law and order and administer justice
in the Bengal villages.
At the same time the British also created a new administrative unit,
originally called the revenue district, and appointed a collector who
lived in the district headquarters, and was not much in touch with the
villages. The revenue district later became the "fundamental unit" of
British, and now Indian and Pakistan's" rural administration. Meanwhile,
the Bengal Zamindars, due to lack of supervision over them, became power-
ful and oppressive to the villagers. They did not bother to provide any
basic amenities like drinking water, and they neglected to maintain any
roads. The results was that. Bengal villages became restless. On the
other hand, the village panchayats had decayed even further.
Hugh Tinker, The Foundations of Local Self Government in India , Paki-
stan and Burma (London: The University of London, Althone Press, 1954) p. 19,
5 lb id
.
,
p. 40.
A.T.R. Rahman, "Basic Democracies and Rural Development In East Paki-
stan", in Inayatullah, ed. , Bureaucracy and Development in Pakistan
(Peshawar: Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, 1952) p. 327.
Quoted from a Bengal Administration Report by A.T.R. Rahman, in
Inayatullah, ed., Bureaucracy and Development in Pakistan
, p. 329.
Because both the Zamindari system and the panchayats had Called, need
for law and order in the Bengal villages had become very urgent, British
administrators realized that the old order had to be replaced with some
new institutions. To meet the law and order situation, the Bengal govern-
ment passed the Chowkidary Panchayat' Act in 1871. The Act provided for
the "union" of several villages, presided over by a five man panchayat
committee. The function of this committee was to appoint village police-
men (chowkidars) to look after the law and order of the villages and to
S
tax the village people for paying the salaries of the chowkidars.
The chowkidari panchayats proved effective for maintaining law and
order in Bengal; they, however, did not provide any services to the vil-
lagers. Roads and bridges were in as bad a shape as ever, drinking water
was not provided, nor were any health and sanitation programmes initiated
by the chowkidari panchayats. Because the villagers were taxed and be-
cause they did not get the services they had hoped for from the chowkidari
9
panchayats, they became dissatisfied with the chowkidari panchayats also.
The Bengal government, sensing new unrest in the villages, passed
after two years of debate, a local self government act of 1885. The act
provided for a comprehensive scheme for rural development. The act of
1885 created three tiers of local bodies, namely, (1) the district board
at the district level, (2) the subdivision board at the subdivisional
.level, and (3) the union committee for a number of villages. The district
board was given the financial and executive powers. Subdivision boards
were made an electoral body for the district boards, and were empowered
°Ibid.
9 Ibid.
to supervise and grant funds for the union committee. The union committees
had no financial or executive power of their own. The union committees
were subservient to the district boards, and were expected to follow the
directives of the district boards.
10
The district boards, working under
the district officer or the collector, performed their duties well and
did provide the basic services and amenities to the villagers, but the
subdivisional boards and the union committees were not effective. In
fact, the first union committee was not organized until 1895, ten years
after passage of the act. 3y 1913 only 61 union committees had been
12
organized in the whole province; this number grew to 156 by 1916-1917.
In 1919 a new local self-government act was passed in Bengal to
upgrade the working of the local bodies. The new act provided for: (1)
broadening of the election base; more people now participated in the
elections than before; (2) the chairman of the district board had to be
elected by the district board; (3) the name of union councils was changed
to union boards; the new union boards were given the executive, municipal
and judicial functions, and (4) a circle officer was appointed under the
subdivisional officer to guide and supervise the work of the union boards.
In this new scheme, district boards and union boards were performing most
of the work; hence, the subdivisional boards (also called the local boards)
13
were abolished later on. The union boards and the district boards
10 Ibid.,,p. 330.
11 Ibid. .,p. 332.
l^His Majesty's Government, Moral and Material Progress and Condi -
tions in India 1916-1917, Statement Presented to Parliament (London;
His Majesty's Stationary oFfice, 1918), p. 3S1.
l*Rahman, op_. cit .
, pp. 333-334.
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continued to function in East Bengal (now East Pakistan) until 1960 when
the new scheme of basic democracies was initiated by President Ayub Khan
in 1960.
World War II and the partition of India and the province of Bengal
(Wast Bengal going to India, and East Bengal, now called East Pakistan,
going to Pakistan) affected the local bodies of Sast Pakistan. The pro-
vincial government had its own numerous problems to solve, and had neither
the administrators nor much financial resources to care for the local
bodies. The political instability which followed the defeat of the Mus-
lim League government in East Pakistan in 195U further worsened the ;\i
situation of the local bodies in East Pakistan.
After independence, as has been mentioned above, the local bodies
had become weak and rural development suffered; something needed to be
done in the villages. Meanwhile, the national government was faced with
the problem of raising food production in the country. Keeping these
objectives in view, the government of Pakistan launched a new rural pro-
gram throughout the country in 1953 with the assistance of the United
States government. This new program was called Village Agriculture,
Industrial development program (V-AID). This new program had no connec-
tion whatsoever with the existing union and local boards. Both had
separate administrations, and separate sources of finance. The objectives
of the village aid program were: (1) to increase the productive output
and real income of the villagers, (2) to increase and improve the com-
munity facilities and services of the village dispensaries, schools,
hospitals, roads, and bridges, etc., (3) to promote the growth of local
organizations which will exist and function on their own initiative, (4)
to provide extension services to the villagers, (5) to make coordinated
11
attempts at problem solving, and (6) to give a welfare outlook to the
administration of the country. To achieve these objectives, the vil-
lage aid program relied on:
(a) process of education, based upon frank and open
discussion with the villagers and (b) planned community
action designed to assist the villagers to acquire the
attitudes, concepts and skills prerequisite to their
democratic participation in the solution of as wide a
range of development projects as possible in an order ^
or priority determined by their increasing level of competence.
For administration purposes, a chief village aid administrator, in the
central health, labour and social welfare, was appointed to run the vil-
lage aid program. On the provincial level there were (1) the admini-
strators of the village aid program, and to assist him in his work, there
were the regional directors, (2) on the development area level, a develop-
ment officer; he was assisted by two supervisors, and (3) twenty men,
village level workers and 5-10 women village workers, assigned to each
development area. To carry out the village aid program, the whole
country was divided into development areas, each composed of a number of
villages and an estimated population of 150,000 people in East Pakistan.
In 1959 there were 134 development areas in the whole country, covering
18,43 6 villages. 18 It was hoped that by 1965 the majority of the villages
Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, Comilla, Basic Democracies
Banual No. 1 (Comilla: Pakistan Academy for Rural Development) 1959, p. 25,
Jack Mezinow and F. A. iantopolo, "Community Development in
Pakistan: The First Five Years", International Social Science Journa
1
,
Vol. XII (1960) No. 3, p. 433.
Pakistan Academy for lural Development, 3asic Democracies Manual
No. 1_ (Comilla 1959) p. 27.
17 Ibid.
*°Mezinow and "antopolo, op. cit
.
,
p. 434.
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of the country would be covered by village aid programs. The village
aid program lasted about eight years (1953-1961) and was abolished by
the martial law government in 1961.
Why did the government abolish the village aid program after spend-
ing some 30 Crores of Rupees (U.S. $ 60 million) on the program?' Various
reasons are given by various people. George Piatt, gives the following
reasons which seem to be logical: (1) the government worried about the
low production of food and appointed a food and agriculture commission.
The commission in its report, published in 1960, recommended that two
agriculture development corporations, one in each province, be located
and that these corporations take over the agriculture development work in
the rural areas of the provinces. (2) the village aid program had not
contributed significantly towards agricultural development. (3) there
was consistent opposition by the agriculture departments, both at the
central and provincial levels. (4) creation of basic democracies. (5)
withdrawal of technical assistance by the United States from the village
21
aid program.
19Government of Pakistan, National Planning Board, The First Five
Year Plan 1955 -1960 (Karachi: Govt, of Pakistan Press, 1957) p. 30.
2Q
Ibid.
21George Piatt, "Agriculture and Administration", in Guthrie Birk-
head, ed.
,
Admin ist rat ive Problems in Pakistan (New York: Syracuse
University Press, 1966) p. 100.
13
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The Basic -Democracy System
Struc ture of 3as ic-Damocrae ies . The Basic-Democracies have four tiers
starting from the "union" of villages to the divisional level.
The Union Council is composed of 12-15 elected members representing the
village population of about 10,000 to 15,000 people. The council in turn
elects its own chairman. Next tier up is the Thana Council on the thana
level. All the chairmen of the union councils become members of the
Thana Council. The rest of the members are from the nation-building
departments (i.e., health, education, various representatives of the
different directorates of the agriculture department, etc.). The Chairman
of the Thana Council is the subdivision officer. There are about 412
Thana Councils in East-Pakistan.
The District Council is made up of all chairmen of Thana Councils,
cantonment boards , etc., and chairmen of the town committees. The rest
are elected from among the chairmen of the various departments also sit
on this council. The deputy commissioner is the chairman of the District
Council. There are seventeen district councils in East Pakistan (one
district council for each district).
The Divisional Council is made up of elected meaibers from the dis-
trict councils plus government officials at the divisional level. The
administrative head of the division, the commissioner, is the chairman
of the Divisional Council.
22 The whole section on 3asic Democracies is based on Lawrence Ziring,
"The Administration of Basic Democracies", in Guthrie Birkhead, ed.
,
Administrative Problems in Pakistan (New York: Syracuse University Press,
1966) pp. 31-62.
*Thana in Sast Pakistan, Tehsil in West Pakistan.
14
Functions. There, are three different categories of functions of the basic
democrats (elected every five years at the union level, 80,000* in all—
40,000 in East Pakistan and 40,000 in Wfest Pakistan). These are (1)
Constitutional, (2) Judicial, and (3) Planning, Development and Admini-
stration of the Development Programmes. Under the 1962 Constitution of
Pakistan," basic-democrats have the sole right to elect the President of
Pakistan, the National Assembly, and the two provincial assemblies every
five years. Also, the members of the union council are empowered to act
as conciliating courts, and to decide minor civil and criminal cases.
However, the planning, development, and administrative functions of the
various councils are the most important. Union councils and the district
councils have the power to levy taxes in the villages; in practice though
most of their funds come from the central and the provincial governments.
The development schemes are planned and executed by the union
councils, but a prior permission has to be obtained from the district
council, if the scheme involves an expenditure up to Rs_: 50,000
($10,000) and from the divisional council, if the scheme involves an
expenditure of Rs: 100,000 ($20,000).
The most important tier, in the Basic -Democracy structure is the
District Council, which has the power to approve or to disapprove any
scheme, or to finance or not to finance the scheme. The Thana Councils
•have no power of taxation and no administrative purpose. The Thana and
the Divisional Councils are there to co-ordinate the schemes and help in
*The National Assembly passed a government bill to raise the number
of Basic -Democracies to 120,000 (60,000 for each wing, to be elected in
the fall of 1969). (Embassy of Pakistan, Washington D.C. , Notification,
December, 1967).
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giving assistance and advice in preparing the schemes.
There is a special administrative organization for the basic demo-
cracies. The administration of the Basic Democracies is a provincial
subject. There is only a basic democracy "cell" in the central ministry
of Information and 3roadcasting. At the provincial level, the minister
in the governor's council of ministers, is in charge of the Department of
Basic Democracies and Social Welfare. Under the minister is the Secretary
of the Department of Basic Democracies and Social Welfare who actually
runs the department. In the field there is a director of basic democracies
(D.B.D.). He is stationed at the divisional level, lie is responsible
both to the commissioner of the division and to the chairman of the divi-
sional council.
Under D.B.D. there are assistant directors (A.D.B.D. ) stationed at
the district level. They are responsible to D.B.D. and to the Deputy
Commissioner of the district (who is also chairman of the District Coun-
cil). A.D.B.D. is also the secretary of the district council. A.D.B.D.
is the most important key person in the whole scheme. He is the man
charged with running, assisting, and co-ordinating various plans and
programmes of all the councils of the district. To assist the A.D.B.D.
there are two or three development officials (D.O.) who sit on the Thana
Councils and supervise and assist in the development and execution of the
programmes of two to three Thanas. Next to A.D.B.D. the D.O. officer is
the most important person. D.O.'s duties and responsibilities, one level
down, are as important as those of his superior (A.D.B.D.). Under the
D.O. are the secretaries of the union councils who are both under the
D.O. and the chairman of the union councils.
CHAPTER II
AGRICULTURE
Of Pakistan's estimated population of 120 million (55% in East
Pakistan), 87% live in the rural areas with 92;i of East Pakistan's
population living in the rural areas. And 75% to 85% of the total labor
force in the country consists of cultivators and agricultural laborers.
Agriculture is very important to Pakistan, not only because it is
the main occupation of Pakistani people, but also because of agriculture's
overall contribution to the economy of Pakistan. Of the total exports
of the country, 86% are based on agricultural raw materials, and 46%
of the gross national product is provided by agriculture. Most of the
major industries of Pakistan, like textiles, jute goods, vegetable oil,
sugar, leather and woolen goods, are dependent on agricultural raw
materials. Most of the transport system, roads, waterways and railroads,
get freight from agricultural commodities and inputs. The widest pur-
2
chasing power for local manufactures comes from rural areas.
Because of these reasons, the importance of agriculture has not
been lost on Pakistan's Planners. The Planning Commission notes:
The importance of agriculture from the point of view of its
share, consumption, exports and employment makes its develop-
ment, one of the critical issues in the planning. iiapid
growth of agriculture would permit the unhampered expansion
1S.A.M. Khan, "The Revolution in Agriculture" Agriculture Supplement,
Dawn , Karachi. April 22nd, 1968, p. 1, col. 6.
2 Ibid.
,
p. 7.
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of other sectors which depend on agriculture demands, and
supplies, and will insure income gains to a large segment
of the population It is difficult to overstate the
importance of agriculture growth. 3
Though since 1955 Pakistan has given top priority to agriculture develop-
ment, progress has been slow and painful. Pakistan, up until 1951, was
self-sufficient in food, and was even a minor exporter. And perhaps be-
cause of this reason the government gave scant attention to agricultural
development. The government's major attention was on industrialization.
In 1952, a major drought hit the country; the government was forced to
import food grains, mostly from the United States, under PL-4S0.
Pakistan's rising population worsened the matter further. The Plan-
ning Commission, recognizing the situation, warned the Government of the
approaching food crisis, and proposed that a total of Us. 1.2 billions
(U.S. $ 500 millions) be spent on agriculture in the country's first
five year plan (1955-1950). The commission projected a 97., increase in
food grains and hoped that the country thereby would become self-suffi-
cient in food production. In actuality, the annual growth in foal output
was 1.3 percent per year while the population grew at. the rate of 2.5
percent. And Pakistan's average annual (almost wholly from the United
•^Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission, Third Five Year Plan
1965-1970 (Karachi: Manager, Government of Pakistan Press, 1965), p.
393. Hereafter referred to as Third Five Year Plan .
4Ibid
. , p. 16.
^These figures were quoted by West Pakistan Food and Agriculture
Minister, Malik Khuda 3ux, at the Rockfeller symposium held in New York,
April 15, 1968, on, "Strategy for Conquest of Hunger." Reproduced in
DAWN, Karachi, April, 1968, p. 7, col. 4.
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States) food imports between 1955-1962 were about 1 million tons. Paki-
stan launched its second five year plan. Again, priority was given to
agriculture and good production. The country allocated 16% of its total
outlay during the second five year plan on agriculture, and projected a
2.9 percent annual growth rate and hoped for an increase of 21% in the
o
agriculture sector at the end of the second five year plan.
To everyone's pleasant surprise, the growth rate of food crops rose
to 3.4 percent, and the total output of food increased by 27 percent
against the planned target of 21 percent.
9 The growth in food production
was about equally shared by both East and West Pakistan.
The causes of the sudden increase in the food production were, (1)
good, sound and stable political leadership, under President Ayub Khan,
who as Commander-in-Chief of the Army had siezed power in 1953 and under-
took land reforms in West Pakistan. (2) input measures of water, fertili-
zer, plant protection and improved seeds. The new government heavily
subsidized fertilizers. The government paid 30 to 407o of the cost of
fertilizer. As a result the intake of fertilizer rose from 30,600
nutrient tons in 1953 to 192,000 nutrient tons in 1965. (3) a better
distribution system of high yielding seeds, by the newly created agri-
cultural development corporations in 1961. (4) price support and new
^Gustav Papanek, Pakistan's Davelopment , Social Goals and Private
Incentives (Cambridge"! Harvard University Press, 1967) p. 147.
7Third Five Year Plan
, p. 116.
8Malik Khuda 3ux, "Strategy for Conquest of Hunger" DAWN , Karachi,
p. 7, col. 4.
9 Ibid.
,
p. 7, col. 4.
10 Ibid.
,
p. 7 , col. 5.
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incentives, given for the first time to the farmers of Pakistan, induced
the farmers to produce those crops which would bring the most money.
During the second five year plan, food production in East Pakistan
kept even pace with r fest Pakistan, and its value of crop output grew by
20%. Of this growth, it is estimated that 5% came from the extension
of the area 1, 5% from fertilizer, 4% from improved seeds, 2~o from plant
protection, and the remainder was attributed to changed rice technology
13
and increased labour inputs.
Getting these results in the agriculture sector made the government
over confident, and it was freely proclaimed by the government that
Pakistan finally had won the battle in its stagnant agriculture sector
and that the country had achieved a breakthrough in food production.
Unfortunately, this proved to be a wrong prediction. During 1965
and 1966 the country was in the grip of two successive droughts and
food production was again severely affected. Pakistan was forced to
import more food grains than ever before.
During the current third plan of Pakistan (1965-1970), Pakistan
proposes to spend about Rs. 5 billion (U.S. $1 billion) in agriculture
sector, equally shared between East and West Pakistan. It is hoped that
annual growth rate in agriculture will be 5%. Some of the objectives
of the third Five Year Plan in agriculture sector are:
Gustav Papanek, Pakistan'
s
Development, Social Goals and Private
Incentives
, p. 150.
12 lb id
.
13 Ibid
.
^Planning Commission, Third Five Yea r Plan
, p. 442.
15 Ibid.
, p. 442.
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(a) To increase the real income of farmers at least at the
same rate as per capita increase in the non-agriculture
sector.
(b) To move towards self-sufficiency in food reprievements
to the extent compatible with other needs of the economy,
including foreign trade, aiming at the same time at
improved nutritional standards in food consumption.
(c) To promote agriculture development on a sound self-
propelling basis and programmes such as the development
of marketing, cooperatives, storage, credit, educational
and other institutional and infrastructure facilities. 16
To achieve these goals, the following strategy would be employed:
(a) more water would be made available not only by the present existing
canals, but also by tube wells (in West Pakistan) and by low lift pumps
(in East Pakistan), (b) new high yielding varieties of wheat and rice
would be made available to the farmers, (c) by increasing the intake
of fertilizers from 162 thousand nutrient tons in 1965 to 436 thousand
nutrient tons by the end of the plan in 1970. (d) incentives to farmers
through assured minimum prices and subsidies on inputs, (e) try to make
available all the inputs at the right place and at the right time by
streamlining the distribution system, (f) projects requiring heavy
investments will be postponed in favour of immediately productive pro-
grammes, and (g) major changes in the organizational, institutional and
policy making establishment which would lead to improved training of
agriculture development projects.
As has been mentioned earlier, during the first two years of the
Plan, the country suffered from bad weather and the growth rate fell
16 Ibid .
, p. 396.
17Malik Khuda 3ux, "Strategy for the Conquest of Hunger", Part IT,
reported in DAWN, April 9, 1968, p. 7, col. 7.
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from 3.4% to 2.5%
18
and Pakistan had actually to import more food than
in previous years. However, the crop harvested in June, 1968, according
to a Pakistani newspaper, because of good weather, was a good one and the
wheat production in West Pakistan reached an all-time high level of 6
million tons. The rice production in East Pakistan was also good.
Once again the government is claiming that Pakistan has achieved a
breakthrough in food production and that by 1970, Pakistan will actually
export rice and wheat.
In my view this is a very premature hope. The important factor of
good weather has to be kept in consideration. There seems to be a posi-
tive correlation between good crops and good weather. A breakthrough
and continued progress in agriculture will not come until the farmer is
awakened and motivated to accept change and produce more.
In the meantime, the growth in agriculture will have to depend
heavily on fertilizers, water, improved seeds and plant protection ser-
vices and, above all, on good weather.
Though Pakistan has made some progress in agricultural production
there are still back-breaking problems, to which we will turn shortly.
In the meanwhile, let us take a brief look at agriculture administration
in East Pakistan.
To implement government's agricultural plans, there are two different
organizations directly concerned with the development of agriculture in
the two provinces. On the provincial level there are (1) Ministry of
Food and Agriculture and (2) the Agriculture Development Corporation.
There is also the Central Ministry of Food and Agriculture but that
18 Ibid.
, p. 7, col. 5.
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Ministry's work is mostly concerned with giving aid, assistance and advice
to the two provinces of Pakistan.
The provincial Ministry of Food and Agriculture is headed by a mini-
ster, appointed by the governor. Under the minister, is the Secretary of
Agriculture and Food who runs the Department.
The field organization is headed by the Provincial Director of Agri-
culture, stationed at the provincial headquarters. On the divisional
level is the deputy director, on the district level is the assistant
director of agriculture, on the subdivisional level there is the subdivi-
sional agriculture officer in charge of about ten thanas. On the thana
level, there is the thana agriculture officer and on the union level is
19
the union assistant.
The Agriculture Development Corporations were created in both of the
provinces in 1961 on the recommendations of the Food and Agriculture Com-
mission in 1960. It is a separate, semi-autonomous body, with its own
board of directors with the chairman as chief executive.
Its main functions are to provide the input services like better
seeds, fertilizers, pest control, renting of tractors and other farm
machinery to the farmers.
19
Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Report
of Food and Arrricultu re Commiss ion (Karachi: Manager, Government Publi-
cations, 1960) p. 157.
20
M. R. Sharif, Modern Economic Development of Pakistan (DACCA:
Mullick Brothers, 1966) p. 107.
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Agriculture Problems of East Pakistan
There are numerous factors which all hamper in agriculture develop-
ment of East Pakistan.
East Pakistan, the land of many rivers, has actually more waterways
21
than roads and railroads. Good roads are a rarity in East Pakistan.
In 1951, the farmers in East Pakistan reported that they had to walk an
average of at least eleven miles to reach surfaced roads, a steamer, or
22
a railroad station.
To develop agriculture, it is most important that the transport
system should be good, as has been pointed out by Mellor:
Readily available, efficient transportation has been shown
to be important to several aspects of adequate market per-
formance. Poor and expensive transportation increased mar-
keting in a number of ways with some of the effects having
a very substantial absolute and percentage effect.-
Another problem in East Pakistan is land fragmentation. Land frag-
mentation has taken place extensively in East Pakistan. Soon after inde-
pendence, a land reform bill was passed by the East Pakistan government
in 1951, abolishing completely the big land holdings. Land was turned
over to the farmers, and no minimum land ceilings were put on the hold-
ings. The result has been that land held by the farmer has been divided
^Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Report of
Food and agriculture Commission (Karachi: Government of Pakistan Press,
1950) p. 3.S. Hereafter referred to as Agriculture Coramiss ion Report .
"Findings of Central Statistical Office quoted by Papanek in,
Pakistan's Development:
,
p. 120.
John W. Mellor, The Economics of Agricultural Development (New
York: Cornell University Press, 1966) p. 340.
24
S. M. Akhter, Pakistan Development Economy (Lahore: Publishers
United Lted. , 1966) p. 147.
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and subdivided among his sons and their sons. The land holdings are
extremely small, the average land holding is between 2.5 acres to 3 acres,
and in a populated district like Dacca and Noakhali, the average is still
25down to 1.5 acres.
According to Akhter Hameed Khan, 15% to 25% of the villagers do not
have any land in East Pakistan, and have no work for half the year. Five
percent to ten percent have surplus land and money (not more than twenty
9 ft
acres). And a vast majority are average small farmers.
When a land holding is too small, when there is tremendous popula-
tion pressure, as is the case in East Pakistan, then the condition of the
farmer and land suffer. The farmer is already under pressure to produce
enough to make both ends meet and he does not have much left to invest in
his laud to improve it.
It has been mentioned elsewhere that East Pakistan receives one of
the highest rates of rainfall in the world, during monsoon period, between
June and September. This rain causes vast floods, which cause extensive
damage to crops.
It is estimated that if effective flood control could be provided in
East Pakistan, then the damage done annually to five to six million acres
27
of land could be averted.
Findings of Dacca University Socio-2conomic Survey Board, quoted
by Beech, Bertocci, Corwin, et al. Inside the East Pakistan Village ,
p. 8.
260baidullah ;Ch3n and Arthur 2aper, eds., Comilla-U.S . AID Conference
Report , June 11 -June 14 , 1963 (Comilla: Pakistan Academy for Rural Develop-
ment, 1 96T)~p~~87
27 Ghulam Mohammad, "Some Strategic Problems in Agriculture Develop-
ment in Pakistan", The Pakistan Development Review , Vol: IV (Summer,
1964) pp. 233-234.
25
While too much water is available during the summer season, not much
water is available during the winter months when the third crop of rice
is sown. As a result winter crop only occupies 3 .8% of the acres under
28
cultivation.
This problem could be easily solved by proviiding water through
irrigation methods.
Some progress has been made in this regard. Until 1965, 200,000
acres were irrigated by low lift water pumps. By 1970, it is hoped that
750,000 acres will be irrigated in East Pakistan.
29
East Pakistan has more land under rice than the combined rice aver-
age of Java, Thailand and Formosa. But its total production of 8 million
tons of rice, is smaller than that of Java. The y ield per acre in East
30
Pakistan is about 1,000 pounds, as compared to .Formosa (2,900), Japan
(3,362) pounds. 31
A typical farmer in East Pakistan is an illitrate person who prac-
tices agriculture on his small plot of land according to his knowledge
acquired through his father who acquired from his father. That is the way
he has known it; that is the way he is going to practice it. All his
care and worry is to feed himself and his family. An average Pakistani
farmer "is bound up in tradition and peasant fatalism and attaches low
importance to economic values as compared to othe r social and national
28Nafis Ahmad, An Economic Geography of East Pakistan, p. 129.
29Third Five Year Plan, p. 401.
30Nafis Ahmed, An Economic Geography of East
Oxford University Press, 1966) p. 123.
Pakistan, (London:
31 Ibid.
, p. 131.
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values of his village."
Problem of Agriculture Credit
The overwhelming number of small farmers in East Pakistan continually
need credit to "tide them over from season to season." The farmers need
credit to improve their agriculture lands, because their incomes from the
lands are so low that they could hardly afford to invest the money in
their lands. 33 The result of all this is that the small farmer is often
forced to sell his crop at a low price, because he has no staying power,
34
has no storage facilities and has demanding creditors to satisfy.
Since only 3% of East Pakistan's credit needs are met by the govern-
ment agencies,35 the farmer turns to one who is his usual source, the
village money lender who usually charges 18% to 50% interest on the cash
advanced. In one study conducted, in Comilla Kotwale thana it was found
that 50% of the total farm produce of the farmers went to the money lender
36
as interest alone.
Sir Malcolm Darling, writing in the twenties about the money lenders
in India, observed:
' • 32 Papanek, Pakistan's ^velopment , p. 148.
33Beech, Bertocci, Laurwin, et. al., Inside the East Pakistan Vil-
lage
, p. 14.
3i;Akhter Hameed Khan, quoted by Obaidullah Khan and Arthur Raper,
eds.
,
U.S. AID Conference Report , June U-June 14, 1963 (Comilla: PARD,
1963) p. 11~ Hereafter referred to as Comilla-AID Conference Report .
35Akhter Hameed Khan, quoted by Obaiadullah and Raper, Comilla -AID
Conference Report
, p. 50.
36Akhter Hameed Khan and Zakir Russain, A New Rural Cooperative
System for Comilla Thana , Third Annual Report 1963 (Comilla: PARD, 1963),
p. 37. Hereafter referred to as Third Annual Raport .
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.... and if a client defaults, he exacts compound interest which
even at 18 percent will double an account in little over four
years. If in addition, as often happens, an element of fraud
creeps in. There is no limit to what a debtor may be called
upon to pay. No where has money-lending been brought to a
finer and more diabolical art than India.3 '
A majority of the money lenders before independence were Hindus who
did not hava any religious injunction against usury as Muslims do, but
after independence their place has been taken by "surplus" land holders
who get around the religious injunction by advancing the loan in cash,
and demanding the repayment in kind (i.e., food grains at the time of
harvest). Thus, for example, if a loan of Rs. one hundred ($20) is to
be returned in kind, 2 maunds (about 165 pounds) of polished rice are
demanded which could be valued at Rs. 60 a maund. Thereby, the farmer
38
pays 67a interest for a period of three or four months.
The Credit Inquiry Commission, in its report to the government,
published in 1959, calculated that a total of Rs. 300 crores ($600 mil-
lion) were needed for agriculture credit in the whol a country, annually.
Against this amount the government agencies only provided Rs. 25 crores
39
($50 millions) annually for the whole country. East Pakistan, accord-
ing to Akhter Hameed Khan, needs at least Rs. 60 crores ($120 millions)
40
annually.
37
Sir Malcolm Darling, The Pun jab Peasant in Prosperity and Dabt
.(Bombay: Oxford University Press, 4th edition, 1947) Introduction, p. 20.
38
3eech, Bertocci, Rahim, at al.
,
Inside the Znst Pakistan Village
,
p. 14-15.
39The figure quoted by 3. K. Islam in "Agriculture Development and
Bank Loan Facilities to Cultivators." Agriculture Supplement, DA^;
,
Karachi, April 22, 1963, p. 9, col. 7.
Akhter Hameed Khan, quoted by Obaidullah Khan and diaper, ConuTla-
AID Conf erance Report
, p. 50.
28
Besides the traditional money lender there are three other agencies
providing rural credit in Pakistan. There are: (1) the government
loans, (2) the agriculture development bank loans, and (3) credit
societies.
Government loans, known as "taccavi loans" are given to farmers
under the Land Improvement Act of 1383 and the Agriculture Loans Act
of 1884. Loans under these acts are given by the Revenue Department,
for land improvement, relief of distress, and for the purchase of seed
or cattle.
U1
Taccavi loans given out by the Revenue Department are hard
to get for small farmers because there is so much red tape involved.
According to one estimate, only 5.6% of the total loans given out by
42
government agencies, are granted in taccavi loans -
: in the whole country.
The Agriculture Development Bank of Pakistan came into existence in
1961 with the merger of the Agriculture Bank and the Agriculture Finance
Corporation. The Bank gives short term 18-month loans at 7% interest,
medium term five year loans at 6% interest, and long term loans over five
year periods also at 6%. Loans are given up to Rs: 1000 ($200) require
personal security, and loans over Rs: 1000 require mortgages, bank
43
guarantee or bank deposit.
According to the Bank's Chairman, S. K. Islam, the Bank had ad-
vanced a total of Rs: 18.81 crores ($37 million) to the farmers in
^Mohammad Irshad, "The Development of Institutional Agricultural
Credit in Pakistan." The Pakistan Development Review . Vol . Ill (Spring,
1963) p. 76.
42 Ibid.
^S. K. Islam, "Agriculture Development and Bank Facilities to
Cultivators", DAWN',, Karachi, p. V, col. 2.
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East Pakistan between 1960 and 1965, and the bank had advanced Rs: 83
crores (U.S. $16 million) in the whole of Pakistan by February, 1968.
34.9% of the bank's loans were for short tern, 36.3% for medium term and
44
28.8% for long term.
Though the Bank came into existence to meet the credit requirements'
of the small land holders, the bank by 1963 had only 120 paying offices
in the whole country, most of them located in cities mostly unknown and
inaccessible to the small farmers.
45 The other difficulty in getting a
bank loan is that bank requires guarantees which make it hard for an
average farmer to get loan. The result is that the Bank mostly serves
the medium and large land holders.
But, on the other hand, the Bank cannot function for long, if it
can not get its money back, therefore, bank has to make sure that the
. 46
money would be repaid.
Until the answer to loan solvency is found, the Agriculture Develop-
ment Bank could not be effective in meeting the needs of the small far-
mers. In addition, more paying offices of the bank should be opened,
which should be nearer to the farmer, to which he could easily travel
and meet his credit needs. The planning commission has recommended that
the bank should open at least one office in each of the thanas of East
Pakistan. 47 If this recommendation could be implemented by the Bank, it
44 Ibid.
,
p. V, col. 8.
45Mohammad Irshad, "The Development of Institutional Credit in
Pakistan ,"p. 77.
46
S. K. Islam, ''Agriculture Development and Bank Loan Facilities
to Cultivators", p. V, col. 3.
47 Planning Commission, Third Five Year Plan , p. 396.
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could go a long way in meeting the needs of the farmers.
The credit cooperative movement is not a new one; the cooperatives
in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent came into existence in 1904
with the
passage of the Cooperative Act in that year. The kct was further
amended
in 1912 when central societies were added to the existing structure
of
48
credit societies.
The credit societies are organized into three tiers: (1) the pri-
mary credit society in the villages, (2) central banks, and (3) the
49
provincial bank on the provincial level.
The primary agricultural credit society could be formed by a mini-
mum o£ 10 persons (maximum of 100) by applying to the registrar of the
co-operative societies of the province. The primary society is based
on the village level. The primary society provides short term and long
term loans for the improvement of agriculture. The liability of members
is unlimited; the capital for working of the societies is derived from
entrance fee and deposits. The primary society is managed by a general
committee, composed of all the members. The general committee elects
the managing committee, appoints the secretary for the society and amends
the bylaws. The managing committee has the power to grant the loans, and
admit new members.
50 Overall working of the primary credit societies is
supervised by the cooperative department of the province, in the ministry
'of agriculture.
^Mohammad Irshad, "The Development of Institutional Credit in Paki-
stan", p. 77.
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The central co-operative banks, , usually at the distr ict headquarters
of the province, provide financial help and assistance tc i the primary
societies. These central banks not only provide loans an d credit to the
primary society 1but these banks also act as regular comma rcial banks in
the towns.
At the apex in East Pakistan are two provincial co-ciperative banks.
The functions of these banks are to control, co-ordinate and finance the
working of the central banks. These ; banks also function as commercial
banks. 52
Though the provincial co-operat:ive banks seem to be working all
right, the working of the central bsinks was found to be unsatisfactory
by the Credit Inquiry Commission in 1959. The Commission
.
found: (1)
that the central banks were poor in administration, (2) that the banks
were engaging in commercial lending for which the banks had little
experience, (3) the banks had unqualified staff, and (4) most of the
53
loans were given to the few influential people, etc.
Considering the agriculture credit co-operative movement has been in
operation since 1904, progress and expansion of the primary societies has
been extremely poor in East Pakistan. In 1959, the Credit Inquiry Commis-
sion reported that there were 4,730 primary agriculture societies in East
Pakistan. Of this number, 1,231 primary societies were defunct, and
3,002 societies were not working satisfactorily. Thus the agriculture
51 Ibid
.
,
p. 269.
52 Ibid
. ,
p. 267.
53
Findings of Inquiry Commission reproduced by S. M. Akhter, Paki-
stan/^ Developing Economy
, pp. 269-270.
5U Ibid.
,
p. 278.
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credit societies between 1949-1959 had not made much progress, and for
all practical purposes were not performing any useful work. During the
Third Five Year Plan (1960-1965) 500 new multipurpose societies (not
only providing credit, but also other services to the members, like
55
marketing, etc.) were organized, but, they have not fared much better.
The causes of the failure of co-operative movement in East Pakistan
are several, these include: (a) the division of co-operative funds to
non co-operative user, (b) political interventions in the working of the
co-operatives, (c) the weakning of the co-operative movement itself, due
to migration of trained staff after partition, (d) frequent transfers of
registrars, poor selection of officers, and (e) lack of government's
interest in the co-operative movement.
There are several proposals to improve the cooperative movement in
East Pakistan. The Credit Inquiry Commission recommended that the govern-
ment should have a clear-cut commitment towards the rural movement. An-
other proposal is that the government should contribute to the funds of
the societies; in this way the credit cooperatives should have enough
money to meet all the credit needs of the members of a society. The
commission also called for better training of the staff of the coopera-
tive department. During the last five year plan, a cooperative college
and four cooperative zonal institutes in each of the divisions of East
Pakistan have been established to train the cooperative staff in the
55
Ibid.
, p. 278.
5 Planning Commission, Third Five Year Plan, p. 420.
57Sharif, op. cit.
,
p. 119.
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agriculture department.
But a more imaginative proposal came from the Food and Agriculture
Commission. The Commission observed:
In our view the primary purpose of credit should be to
create additional production. A basic defect of rural credit
systems that have so far been organized has been that they
have not provided for the supervision of the use of the credit
given and thus the diversion of credit to unproductive purpose
has not prevented. The main reason for this lack was the non-
realization of the great importance of supervision and the
absence of enough personnel in the field to see that each
borrower was reallv using his loan in the best way, for the
59purpose for which it was granted.
Except for the establishment of the cooperative college, the pro-
vincial government has not moved, in the direction suggested by the
Credit Commission. Perhaps this is because the government of East Paki-
stan is more attracted towards the experiments carried out by the Rural
Academy at Comilla, which are recounted later in this paper.
Marketing Management
Marketing management essentially involves three things: (1) to
decide what the demand for food and fiber will be each year and in what
quantities, (2) to sell what ever is produced at a time and place to
get the highest return, and (3) to move the farm products from producer
to the consumer at the lowest price.
61
In East Pakistan, there is no adequate system of regulated markets.
5S Ibid.
, p. 303,
59Government of fakistan, Food and Agriculture Commission Report,
p. 303
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y
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There are government storage facilities available for government
ft o
stocks for about 8 million tons in East Pakistan. But no large scale
facilities are provided by the government to the farmers.
The transportation systems are bad, the markets are far away, and
because the farmer is so hard pressed for money, the farmer in East Paki-
stan sells his crop without getting his fair share and adequate compen-
sation for his labours. It is estimated that if the farmer in East
Pakistan sold his crop immediately after the harvest he will forfeit at
least 30,j of his income.
When it is realized that the good prices are good incentive to the
farmers, which induces farmers to produce more, all efforts should be
made by the government to meet this particular need. If nothing else is
done, at least storage facilities and market prices should be made known
to the farmers, as recommended by the Agriculture Commission. 5
It has been the tradition in East Pakistan, as elsewhere in Pakistan
and India over many centuries, to plough the land with two bullocks and
a wooden plough, which according to one definition is a "tongue of wood
fitted on iron tooth, a stilt for holding and a pole for attachment of
62 Third Five Year Plan
,
p. 426.
° Akhter Hameed Khan and Zakin Hussain, A New Rural Co-operative
System for Comilla Thana (Comilla: Pakistan Academy for *ural Develop-
ment , 1953) p. 27.
64 lb id.
"Agriculture Commission Report
, p. 301.
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bullocks.'* 66 Bullocks of Bengal, unlike those of "est Pakistan, tend to
be smaller and not very strong and therefore, not suitable for a heavy
iron plough.
The other problem which makes many people advocate the adoption of
mechanization in East Pakistan is the fact of the competition between the
bullock and the people for available food.
According to Anwaruzzaman' s study of Comilla thana, carried out by
him in 1961, there were 1579 persons per square mile depending on only
580 acres for their livelihood. At the same time, there were 600 bullocks
in the same square mile depending on the same land for their food. ' The
result has been that the population of the bullocks has been steadily de-
creasing.
Taking these factors into consideration and the fact that the wooden
plough, in any case, does not go deep enough into the soil to be of good
use, many people have been pressing for the adoption of tractors in East
Pakistan instead of ploughs now being used.
The use of tractors and other mechanical implements nevertheless
have their advantages and disadvantages which we shall now examine. The
advantages are: (1) the tractor harrowing is deeper than bullock plough-
ing. The depth of tractor harrowing varies between 4 inches to 5 inches,
whereas, the usual plough used in East Pakistan does not go deeper than
N. G. Mukerjee, quoted by Anwaruzzaman Khan, Introduction of
Tractors in a Subsistance Farm Economy (Comilla: Pakistan Academy for
Rural Development, 1962) p. 4-.
Anwaruzzaman Khan, Introduction of Tractors in a Subsistance Farm
Economy, p. 7.
68 lbid.
,
p. 7.
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three inches. (2) a quality tractor is more superior to wooden ploughing
by about four times. (3) the tractor could be used on hard soil much
more easily than the wooden plough. (4) while two bullocks could plough
only half an acre a day, a small tractor can plough six to eight acres a
day. (5) five labourers are required to weed one acre of land; the small
tractor can do the job of weeding equivalent to ten labourers. (6) by
using the tractor, farmer could save time, and be able to prepare the rice
seed bed ahead of time before the monsoon rains arrive. Thus, he can sow
the first crop earlier and reap the crop earlier, which can give him time
to sow the second crop earlier and thus would enable him to sow the third
crop. 69 Another advantage in using the tractors is the psychological one.
The tractor has more status than a pair of bullocks, especially, with a
young man who goes to school and identifies with things modern. Bullocks
do not appeal to him much because of the hard work involved and because
it would lower his status to that of a village peasant who is uneducated
and "uncivilized." Anwaruzzaman observed in his study that a village
boy, "After receiving some years of schooling felt embarrassed about
holding the plough which his father used, but this same boy was proud
when given the chance to drive a power machine like a tractor."
The disadvantages of tractors are: (1) tractors demand work shops,
and maintenance, there are not too many tractor maintenance workshops
•close to ths villages to repair the tractor if such a need is felt.
Farmers are too illiterate and not mechanical minded to look after the
69 Ibid
., pp. 46-47.
70Ibid.
,
p. 27.
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tractor themselves. (2) the ordinary tractors are not suited for
wet crops like paddy. (3) the land holdings are too small in East Paki-
stan to enable a farmer to use the tractor economically. Since the trac-
tor is much more expensive than a pair of bullocks. It has been shown
that a farmer must earn initially on. the average of Rs. 5500 (U.S. $1500)
(the average annual income of farmers in East Pakistan is around U.S. $50),
annually to meet the tractor cost alone. If the tractor breaks down after-
wards, the farmer is in serious trouble. (4) spare parts are not avail-
72
able when needed.
An ordinary tractor with two rubber tires does not work properly on
wet land, which is essential for the rice crop. An effort has been made
by East Pakistan Agriculture Development Corporation to introduce Japanese
style power tillers in East Pakistan. The Planning Commission has recom-
mended that a power tiller manufacturing plant be established in East
73
Pakistan to meet all the requirements of the province.'
Arguments have also been made that large scale mechanization would
produce unemployment in Pakistan where there is not too much industrial
base to absorb displaced labour. But to this, a counter argument has
been made by the Food Commission. The Commission argues:
The standard objection in Pakistan to mechanization of
agriculture is fear of widespread unemployment and it is a
very valid one. Moreover, it is important to use to the
fullest extent the one resource the country has in abundance,
namely human labour.
Nevertheless, there are strong reasons for examining the
case for mechanization. In judging its value there is need
71Akhter Hameed Khan and Zakip Russain, A New Rural Cooperative System
for Corn i ll a Than-i
,
Third Annual Report
, p. 25.
72Anwaruzzaman Khan, Introduction of Tractors in. Subsistence Farm
Economy
, pp. 59-50.
73 Tha Third Five Year Plan, p. 402.
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to assess whether its use may not earn or save foreign- exchange
than its importation costs, and by increasing production, create
far more jobs in the long run than it displaces.
It is true that in Pakistan industrialization has not
reached a stage where population displaced from land can
easily find employment. When individuals are displaced
real human problems are created, but these individual cases
of hardships have to be compared with the prospect of poverty
and unemployment faced by the whole country if agriculture
production is not increased.
Finally, machine power by its very effectiveness can
have great value psychologically. One of the great benefits
has been to reduce the general conservation and inertia of
rural areas because it can take away a great deal of the
drudgery and uncertainty of farming. It can change the
status of the workers in agriculture as it has in the west-
ern world from the low level associated with unskilled drudaery
to the higher level of respect accorded to the technician. 7^
To achieve province-wide full mechanization (besides the tractors)
would require building of distinctive organization, creation of physical
structures of roads to the villages to supply them economically all the
materials and spare parts they need, and provisions of well-equipped
workshops for the maintenance of all farm machinery. A good number of
mechanics would have to be trained to man the workshops. Farmers would
have to be provided with credit and training to buy and operate the
machines. Above all, it would require convincing and demonstrating to
the farmers that it is to their advantage to buy and use the tractors
and other machines rather than go on with the old methods. This involve:
complex problems of planning and persuasion which will have to be taken
into consideration before widespread mechanization is attempted in East
Pakistan. 75
7il
Agriculture Commission Report
, pp. 106-107.
-'Akhter Hameed Khan and Zakifi Hussain, od. cit.
, p. 24.
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There are five ingredients or inputs needed by the agriculture which
have been recognized to be basic and vital for agriculture yields. The
"first five" are: (1) fertilizers, (2) good seeds, (3) plant protec-
tion, (4) adequate water, and (5) extension service.
The method of applying the right type of artificial fertilizer to
the soil, accompanied with high yielding seed, adequate water, and adequate
pest control, is one of the cheapest and quickest methods available today
to raise food production and to improve the crop yields.
The consumption of fertilizer in Pakistan grew three fold by 1964,
but still it covered only 107o of the sown acreage, even though, the
government paid 50% subsidy on the fertilizers. In Pakistan the fertilizer
consumption is far below that of most of the countries of the world .
The Third Five Year Plan's goal is to improve the intake of the fertilizers
from 162 thousand plant nutrient tons in 1965 to 484 thousand plant nut-
78
rient tons by 1970.
The distribution of fertilizer, on the other hand, is not efficient.
There seems to be administrative bottlanecks and problems of co-ordina-
tion in East Pakistan. The distribution of fertilizer in East Pakistan
is handled by the Agriculture Development Corporation, the Cooperative
Societies and private dealers. 79 In 1960 and 1961, three-fourths of all
the farmers in East Pakistan heard about the advantages of fertilizers,
76Gustav Papanek, Pakistan's Development , Social Goals and Private
Incentives
, p. 171.
77 Third Five Year Pj£n_, p. 405.
78 Ibid.
79Gustav Papanek, op_. cit
.
,
p. 171.
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80but only one-third had used it. In many cases, the fertilizer was out
of stock and distribution depots were closed when farmers wanted to have
fertilizer, and stores were too far away from the villages. This condi-
tion improved later on with the help of the Agriculture Development Cor-
p I
poration. The main hope of Pakistan's planners in achieving self-
sufficiency in food lies in raising the intake of fertilizers from 162
thousand nutrient tons in 1965 to 484 thousand nutrient tons in 1970, and
by supplying good seeds. Intake of fertilizers will not be achieved until
distribution problems are solved and the farmers get fertilizer at the
right time and right place.
Like artificial fertilizer, supplying improved seeds is one of the
best and economical ways to improve yields. The Second Plan suggested
that at least 507o of the total sown area be supplied with improved seeds
82by 1965. ' In the West Wing of the country, supplying of improved seeds
by the West Pakistan Agriculture Development Corporation (WADC) , during
1962-65, was better (which is one of the main causes of West Pakistan's
good production in 1967-68). But the progress of EiSt Pakistan Agricul-
ture Development Corporation (EADC) had not been good during the same
83period. ' Though some progress has been made lately in East Pakistan,
still during 1960-65, one-half of the farmers in East Pakistan did not
80Finding of National Sample Survey, reproduced by Papanek, Pakistan's
Development
,
Social Goals and Private incentives
, p. 154.
sl Papanek, Pakistan's Davelopment
, p. 164.
82Recommendations of second five year plan, reproduced by Planning
Commission, in Third Five Year Plan, p. 407.
83 Planning Commission, Third Five Year Plan, p. 407.
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84get good seeds when they had needed them. EADC has not only the res-
ponsibility of supplying the seed but also producing improved seeds on
its seed multiplication farms. In this field also the progress has not
been so good, as had been hopad for. EADC has shown some progress lately,
but it needs to function still more effectively if East Pakistan is to
achieve its goals of extensive supply of improved seeds and timely supply
of fertilizers.
The pest control service in Pakistan is provided by extension workers
of the provincial agriculture department. In East Pakistan, one extension
worker is attached with each of the union councils for providing pest
control service to the farmers. Pest killing, done usually with hand and
power sprays from the ground, is free of charge to the farmers, but still
farmers fail to take much advantage of this. According to Pakistan's
Agriculture Joint Secretary, the minimum loss to the crops in Pakistan
from pest infection is about 735 crores (U.S. $490 millions) annually. 85
Total expenditure on pest control during Third Plan is proposed to be
around Rs. 85 crores (U.S. $170 millions). 86
One distinct disadvantage of new improved seeds is that there is
more increased weed growth with them and also new seeds bring new diseases
which could prove very disastrous in the long run, if not checked in
87
advance. Therefore, it would be wise on the part of the government to
84 Ibid.
85Yam in Qureshi, "Self-sufficiency in Food," Dawn, Karachi, April
22, 1968, p. 4, col. 4.
86Ibid
.
87 Ibid.
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not only spend more on plant protection, but also to improve the quality
of the extension workers. Untrained and unmotivated extension workers
oo
are one of the causes of poor results in fighting the plant diseases.
Extension agents residing in the "unions" of East Pakistan, besides
carrying out plant protection work, have the responsibility of demon-
strating new improved practices in agriculture on their demonstration
farms, and are required to give advice to the farmers on various agricul-
ture problems. In terms of numbers, extension workers are thought to be
adequate in East Pakistan. 89 But in quality they are considered to be
poor. Most of them are high school graduates with one year training in
agriculture schools. Performance has been quite poor. If Pakistan is
to introduce new methods of cultivation, new seeds, etc., then it is
imperative that extension personnel should be well trained. Besides
extension personnel, radio, television (limited use in East Pakistan),
and basic democrats have also been employed for extension purposes in
Pakistan. 90 How far these media have been effective in disseminating
of agriculture knowledge in East Pakistan remains to be determined.
Continued progress in agriculture will depend, on a short range
basis, on new methods of cultivation, mechanization, and improved seeds.
In the long run, however, agriculture growth will have to depend on
agriculture research, and an extension service capable of absorbing and
•transmitting continuously new techniques to the farmers.
88 lb id
.
89 Third Five Year Plan
,
p. 411.
90Yamin Qureshi, "Self Sufficiency in Food", Dawn , Karachi, April 22,
1962, p. 2.
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Continuous progress in agriculture in East Pakistan will demand that
the province should have its own adequate research facilities, as well as
enough supply of well trained people in agriculture to conduct research
and shoulder all agriculture development work. As the matters stand now,
91
there is only one agriculture research station in East Pakistan at Tejgaon,
and whatever research is conducted there hardly reaches the thana head-
quarters, let alone the villages, due to the weak extension service. One
research station is quite inadequate to conduct research for the whole
province. What is needed is that each of the districts of East Pakistan,
which are not all alike in soil and climatic conditions, should have at
92
least one agriculture research station.
Agriculture as a profession, and the agriculture department, have
traditionally enjoyed a lower social status in the society and in the
government. The result has been that the people acquired as employees
by the agriculture departments in the country often cannot find employ-
93
ment elsewhere. In East Pakistan, there is one agriculture university
at Mymensingh, one agriculture college at Tejgaon and four agriculture
schools. A new agriculture college and six more agriculture schools were
proposed to be set up during the third plan period, which it is hoped
will produce 6000 agriculture graduates (including those from the agri-
culture schools) by 1970. It was estimated in 1963 that the East
91 Third Five Year Plan
,
p. 414.
92
" Benjamin Ferguson, quoted by Khan and Raper, Comilla -AID Conference
Report
, p. 34.
93Agriculture Commission Report
, p. 151.
9
^Ihird Five Year Plan, pp. 413-414.
95 Ibid.
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Pakistan requirement for trained agriculture personnel was six thousand
persons.
^
6 if East Pakistan is to embark on an expanded research pro-
gram, and on an agriculture development program, it would be necessary
to train the people to shoulder these responsibilities. East Pakistan
will have to expand the existing training institutions to meet these
challenges. Meanwhile, care should be taken that the quality of educa-
tion and training does not suffer. More people, perhaps, should be
sent abroad to qualify to take over the expanded program of agriculture
education and training.
One particularly difficult problem faced in the development of
agriculture— is the rigid attitude of the farmers towards change. In
one study, of 63 farmers in Comilla, on the adoption of new and improved
practices in: (1) sowing and transplanting paddy in lines, (2) use
of insecticides, (3) use of chemical fertilizer, and (4) cultivation
of wheat, Rahim found, on the average, awareness to trial period (adop-
tion stages were, awareness, information, trial period and adoption) was
2.5 years for line sowing, 2.2 years for insecticides, and 3.8 years for
chemical fertilizers. The average score for adopting all the four prac-
tices was 24 (on the linear scale of 0-100). All the 63 farmers were
aware of the four practices; 82.5?o had passed the awareness stage and had
gathered detailed information about the line sowing; 25% adopted the
fertilizers; 25% had adopted insecticides, but no one had tried to culti-
07
vate wheat.
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Dr. Leigton, quoted by Obaidullah and Raper in, Comilla -ATD
Conference Report
, p, 3 5.
97Syed Rahim, Diffusion and 'Vdopt ion of Agricultural Practices :
A Study in a Village in E:ist Pakistan (Comilla: Pakistan Academy for
Rural Development, 1962), p. 36.
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Rahim further found that "impersonal sources" like radio and propa-
ganda materials were useful at the earlier stages of adoption. "Personal
sources", like an extension agent, friends, and especially relatives, were
important at the later stages of adoption. Farmers having more access to
both impersonal and personal sources were the earlier adopters. Earlier
adopters became influential for the late adopters. And if a farmer
adopted one new practice, he was willing to try all other new practices.
Rahim' s conclusions about the factors influencing the adoption of new
practice were: the size of farm (the larger the farm the easier it was
for the farmers to adopt a new agriculture practice), membership in organi-
zations and contacts with the information sources (the more the sources
of information, the easier it was for the farmers to adopt a new agricul-
ture practice), and age (older farmers were more resistant to change).
99
Formal or college education were found to be not an important factor.
The traditional society, by its very nature, is not easy to change.
But at the same time, it is not totally impossible to change, if right
ingredients of propaganda, extension agents and evidence of new profits
could be shown to the farmers.
Explaining the importance of profits as an agent of change, the West
Pakistan minister of Agriculture observed:
The truth is that traditional rural society is bogged
down in low income, static economy, and is held in vicious
circle of cause and effect. Poverty breeds social ills like
malnutrition, disease and ignorance which depresses output
and income, which in turn breeds the same social evils. There
is only one way to break this chain and that is to snap the
link, that is to exploit the profit motive. Minor profits
93 Ibid.
,
p. 4.
"ibid.
,
p. 38.
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do not interest the farmer, he is accustomed to attributes
such as variations to the nature of farm productivity and
also high sensitivity to changes in the weather. But if
he can be really convinced by practical demonstrations
that change will bring substantial profits, we have found
him ready to accept any new idea.
Malik Khuda Btix, "Strategy for Conquest of Hunger", Dawn
, Karachi,
April 6, 1968, p. 7.
CHAPTER III
BASIC DEMOCRACIES AND AGRICULTURE DEVELOPMENT
The executive order of 1959, which established the Basic Democracies,
identified agriculture to be one of the functions of the union councils;
the order partly reads, "A Union Council shall be responsible for agricul-
ture, industrial, and community development in the unions." After the
introduction of the Basic Democracy scheme by President Ayub Khan, as
has been mentioned above, the Village Aid program came to an end. And
the Village Aid workers were attached with the Union Councils. It was
hoped that various councils of the Basic Democracies, and especially the
union council, would help in agriculture and village development.
When the Basic Democracy councils came into existence, there were
various opinions how the union councils could best serve in the develop -
ment of agriculture in East Pakistan.
The chairman of the union councils thought that they should have the
(a) agriculture staff, under them, and the staff should help the chair-
men in the agriculture development, (b) that the union councils should
issue the seed, the fertilizer, etc., (c) union councils should organize
the cooperatives in the villages and act as their chairman, etc., and
(d) union councils should have total responsibility of total development
of their respective unions and the government staff should assist them
Reproduced by Ghayasuddin Chughtai in, Basic -Democracies Order
1959 (Lahore: Shahnawaz Brothers, 1967) p. 12.
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whenever necessary and that union councils should be left on its own.
Professor Fairchild even went one step further. He suggested that
not only the union councils should plan and administer all types of
development work, but also raise the taxes to carry out their development
program. Some villagers of East Pakistan thought that union councils
should meet all their, "'felt needs" but the villagers also thought that
this could not be done without the support and financial assistance of
the government. The Agriculture Commission, as far as agriculture was
concerned, recommended that "agriculture was too important a subject to
be left to the whims of the union councils." The commission suggested
that the union councils should provide support to the personnel of the
Agriculture Department and other agencies working in the unions, in other
words the councils should help in carrying out the government policies.
Considering the above viewpoints, it would seem there were two main schools
of thought, concerning the future role of the union councils and the thana
councils in East Pakistan. One advocated a complete independent role for
these councils, the other, wanted to give the councils a role of support
and assistance to the governmental programs. This is not so surprising
because, after all, one of the functions of the councils is to associate
the people with government administrators and the government programs.
^Agriculture Commission Report
, pp. 191-192.
3 Henry Fairchild, "A Model for Rural Development", Journal of East
Pakistan Academy for Rural Development
,
Vol. II (April, 1961) p.~T57~
^Results of Survey carried out by A. T. Rahman, Basic Democ racies at
the Grass Roots
.
Technical publication
,
No
.
13 (Comilla: Pakistan Academy
for Rural Development, 1962) p. 80.
The Agriculture Commission Report
, p. 92.
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The. working picture of the union councils in East Pakistan that
emerged by 1962, was that of complete domination of the union councils
by the provincial Basic Democracy administrators; the union councils
were being treated as "government agencies." Three union councils in-
vestigated by Rahman had 85% of their agenda for meetings fixed by the
government officials, and "all the activities of the union councils in
the field of development, except roads and tube wells were initiated by
the government."
Despite the fact that the majority of the members of the union coun-
cils in East Pakistan tend to be farmers, most of the developmental work
carried out by the union councils has been mostly in the field of what is
generally known as "public works", building roads, bridges, etc. The
union councils work for the most part, has not directly dealt with agricul-
ture and farmers and the councils have shown great unwillingness to engage
in agriculture development programs. Sometimes, councils have earmarked
funds for agriculture implements, etc., but often have not utilized the
money so earmarked.
Rahman, Basic Democracies at the Grass Roots
,
p. 87.
In one study of 120 union councils, it was found that 90;S members
were farmers, 2.5% were in some profession, 5% were businessmen, 1.7% were
in service, 1% day labourers, 8.3% had average land holdings of k acres.
The largest age group was 35-39 years category with an average of 40.5
years. 85'i were heads of their respective families. No one was illiterate,
457o had high school diplomas, 2 were college graduates, and one post gradu-
ate. S. M. Hafiz, L. Zaidi, W. H. Zaidi, Annual Evaluation Report 1960
(Comilla: Pakistan Academy for Rural Development) pp. 11-12.
^The average annual income of a union council in East Pakistan is said
to be around Rs. 13,500 (U.S. $2500) derived mainly by taxing land and build-
ings, rate for village police, taxes on vehicles, boats, local rate share
from district council and the governmental grants, Government of Parkistan,
Twenty Years of Pakistan (Karachi: Pakistan Publications , 1967) p. 115.
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The provincial government under its "grow more food" campaign in
1962 asked the union councillors that, since most of them were farmers
they themselves should adopt the line sowing, prepare composite heaps
and cow dung pit. The councils discussed all these topics and took for-
mal resolutions. But the basic democrats, did little to carry out the
resolutions. 9 There are several reasons why the union councils have
shown disinclination to engage more actively in agriculture development.
Historically the union boards which existed in East Pakistan before the
union councils did nothing more than build and repair roads, bridges,
etc. It was thought that development only meant that roads were to be
developed, bridges to be constructed.
10 This tradition of many years is
still strong in East Pakistan. Though the union councils earmarked the
funds for agriculture development at the goading of the government, they
did not quite know or understand how to go about drawing the plans for
agriculture development and spend the money for the money for that pur-
pose. It is not hard for them to build and maintain roads. They have
been doing this for many years. The basic democrats have very little
inclination and orientation towards agriculture development than for any
other development.
Chairmen and the members of the union councils often did not like
the pressure tactics of the government. Moreover, the proposals for
agriculture development were coming from the top which the union coun-
cillors did not consider their own. The result was that union councillors
^Rahman, Basic Democracies at the Crass Roots , p. 3,
lOlbid.
11 Ibid.
, p. 54.
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passed a number o£ resolutions to show the government that they were
complying with the wishes of the government, but in actuality, did very
12
little to implement these resolutions.
President Ayub Khan, a keen observer of the Basic Democracies (credits
himself for conceiving and initiating the scheme of Basic Democracies in
Pakistan) realizing that the union coucils were not doing much in the
agriculture development, suggested in a minute, circulated among the top
government officials on February 27, 1964, that union councils, could do
more in the field of agriculture, particularly, "In modernization, utili-
zation of fertilizers, production and utilization of modern implements,
better crop rotation, correct use of water and farm yard manure service
cooperatives for procurement of necessities and scale of produce. .. .credit
cooperatives farming of different type of poultry terracing, tree
13
plantation organized breeding and upgrading of cattle and sheep."
The Expert Committee on the Problems of Local Taxation of the central
government was convened to consider how the funds could be raised to
implement the President's proposal. The consensus of opinion at the
Expert Committee was that the Union Councils should not provide the
money. Someone at the meeting gave the opinion that since communist
China and Yugoslavia have been fairly successful in making good progress
in agriculture and rural industrial development, through local institu-
tions not unlike Pakistan's Basic Democracies, parhaps Pakistan could
1
Ibid
.
, pp. 87-88.
13 Quoted by Lawrence Ziring, "The Administration of Basic Democracies",
in Guthrie Birkhead, ed.
,
Administrat ive Problems in Pakistan (New York:
Syracuse University Press, 1966) p. 54.
Quoted by Ziring, "The Administration of 3asic Democracies", p. 55.
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learn from these two countries. This proposal did not go further and vas
opposed by central government's Deputy Secretary of Information and Broad-
casting (who is in charge of the Basic Democracy cell in the Central Mini-
stry of Information and Broadcasting). In Deputy Secretary's view, Paki-
stan did not have a sufficient experience of union councils taking up
economic projects of the type which have been taken up by the local bodies
in Yugoslavia and China, he maintained that such economic projects cannot
be successful in Pakistan, because there was no strong political party in
Pakistan, as was the case in China and Yugoslavia to supervise these pro-
jects. 15
President Ayub Khan circulated another minute in April, 1965, sug-
gesting that ward committees be created below union councils and based
on Sasic Democracies. President envisaged a ward committee of four or
five, "prominent members of different groups in the ward", who were to
meet as often as possible, to discuss local problems and to review re-
sults of local effort and to assist in the planning of schemes of their
ward. The President also thought that the ward committees should be
asked to organize the villagers and the farmers in their villages for
collective community action programmes , like common ploughing, joint
thrasing, etc., etc. The President recommenced that the government
should support this, what amounted to be an agricultural develop-no-*
program, educatienally and financially. Educational support would be
provided by printing the material in vernicular languages, providing
15Memoran'dum by M. Uhsanallah, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of
Inf or "-ii Wri and broadcasting, April <5 , 196^, quoted by Lawrence Zirinig,
in Ibid.
,
pp. 55-56,
1
"President A.yub quoted by Lawrence Ziring, lb id
.
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charts and other propaganda materials and broadcasting the farm programs.
Financially, the State would help build the infrastructures. Money for
this can be found, the President suggested, by diverting a bulk of the
funds, meant for the iforks Program, to the building of infrastructure in
each ward, instead of spending it on individual union schemes. This would
not only ensure in President's view, a better use of funds but also help
in improving the economic life of the people. The President's recommenda-
tions were accepted by the Governor's conference (highest policy making
body during President Ayub's administration; consisting of President,
two governors, vice chairman of the Planning Commission and key provin-
cial and central ministers) at their meeting on June 1, 1965. Plans
were made to launch "communal pilot projects" in one or two unions of
each district of East Pakistan and Vest Pakistan through the ward com-
mittees. 17 The program was to start on October 27, 1965. Meanwhile, a
three man delegation made of directors of works program in East and Uest
Pakistan, representative of East Pakistan Basic Democracy department and
central deputy secretary of ministry of Information and Broadcasting, were
sent to China where they spent four weeks to study the communes and to
recommend to the government if the Chinese system could be adopted in some
form in Pakistan. 18 Apparently the work of the ward committees is still
Lawrence Ziring, Ibid .
,
p. 59.
18Government's announcement appeared in the Pakistan Times , June 21,
1965, reproduced by Ziring. It is interesting to note that President Ayub
reorganized, his Muslim-League party into union Muslim League, Thana/
Tehsil League, Divisional Muslim League, provincial Muslim League and
Pakistan Muslim League. Thus correlating with basic democracy structure.
The Members of the various councils who were Muslim Leaguers -had to form
Muslim League party and "supervise and keep close watch" on the working
of the councils. Each of the upper tier of the Muslim League was sup-
posed to supervise the functioning of lower tiers.. For description of
Ayub's scheme of his reorganization, see Appendix, Lawrence Ziring, op .
cit.
, pp. 61-62.
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in the experimental stages, because nothing much has been reported on
their progress.
The main contribution of the union councils towards rural develop-
ment in East Pakistan has been through the rural works program. Though
this program was not started to benefit agriculture, the program never-
theless has contributed towards agriculture development, especially in
flood protection and building up of rural road networks in East Pakistan.
The Works Program has gone a long way in giving new direction and impor-
tance to the various councils of Basic Democracy scheme. As such, the
rural works program in East Pakistan will be examined a bit closer in the
next chapter.
CHAPTER IV
THE RURAL WORKS PROGRAM
On the basis of a proposal of the Planning Commission, the Pakistan
Academy for Rural Development at Comilla started a pilot works program
in Comilla Kotwal i Thana in 1961. The objects of this pilot program
were: to increase employment in the rural area of East Pakistan, and to
increase the income of the villages of East Pakistan. The United States
government agreed to finance the project by releasing Rupees Counterpart
funds, held under PL-480. The Academy carried out the works program
with the cooperation of Comilla Thana Council, and the Union Council's
of the Comilla Thana. The experimental program lasted for ten months,
and the Academy in its report to the Central and provincial governments
suggested that it was possible to introduce and expand the works pro-
gram throughout the province.
A province wide works program in East Pakistan was carried out in
1962-1963 at the cost of Rupees 100 million (U.S. $20 million). Of
this amount, District Souncils spent. $10 million, Thana Councils $1
million, Union Councils $?| million, and municipal and town committees
$4.5 millions. 2 In 1963-1964, (U.3.$) 40 million were spent in East
*Akhter Hamad Khan, "The Cenisis of Works Programme: First Experi-
ment in Comilla Kotwali," in K. M. Tiper Sultan, ed. , The .Jorks Programme
in Comilla : \ Case Study (Comilla: Pakistan Academy for Rural Development,
1966) p. 29.
A. T, Raf iquar Rahman, An Evaluatio n of T
-fo rks Programme in ^ast
Pa kista n 1963-64 (Comilla: Pakistan Academy for Rural Development,
1964) p. 7. ~~
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Pakistan on the rural works program. Of this amount District Councils
spent (U.S. $12 million), Thana Councils spent $11.4 million, Union
Councils $6 million, Thana and training development centers $3 million,
and the rest of the money was spent on training, research, and evalua-
3
tion.
Added emphasis was given to the Hbrks Program in the Third Plan,
when for the first time, the /orks Program was recognized to be xie of
the major fields of national concern. Rs. 18,200 millions (U.S. $500
million) are proposed to be spent during the ThirS Plan Period (1965-
1970). The United States Government, instead of paying the total cost
as before (through its release of PL-480 counterpart funds) would now
contribute Rs. 1 billion (U.S. $200 million), and Pakistan Government
would provide the balance of $3 00 million. East Pakistan's share is
$300 million of the total outlay of $500 million.
Planning , Execution and Supervision of the T forks Program
Each union council is supposed to prepare its .plan of development
which is then submitted to the Thana Council for its approval. Simili-
arly, the Thana Councils, District Councils and the Divisional Councils
submit their schemes to District Councils, the Divisional Councils and
the Provincial local government department, respectively, for approval
of their plans. The schemes, which are, labour intensive, are given
priority. The schemes, costing Rs. *4-0,000 ($10,000) require approval
3 Third Five Year Plan
,
p. 511,
4 Ibid.
,
p. 515.
5 lb id.
, p. 512,
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of the district council and schemes costing ever $10,000 and up to Rs.
500,000 ($100,000) require the approval of divisional council. Schemes
costing more than $100,000 must be sanctioned by the provincial T-brks
Committee of the provincial government.
6 At the union council level,
to executive the schemes, project committees are formed for individual
projects. Sometimes one project committee supervises more than one pro-
ject. The project committee usually includes the chairman of the union
council, two or three union councillors, and an equal number of non
councillors. The secretary of the union council keeps the records of the
project. The projects are supervised and watched over by the Basic
Democracy administrative staff at the district level, namely the assis-
tant director and development officers.
The results of the SJbrks Program have been very encouraging. During
1962-1963, 3600 miles of earth roads were constructed, and 1300 miles of
water channels were excavated. In 1963-1964, 29,500 miles were con-
structed, 5400 miles of choked -up channels were excavated to speed up
the drainage, and 3700 miles of enbankments were constructed to protect
against the perennial floods in East Pakistan.
7 An evaluation report in
1963-1964, on 3ast Pakistan's Works Program found that the .'orks Program
was labour intensive; 73% of the money was spent on the wages of the
labourers; 23% of the money was spent on materials; 4% expenditure was
on overhead costs; and Rs. 600,000 (U.S. $150,000) were spent on 516,000
6Lawrence Ziring, "The Administration of Basic Democracies", in
Guthrie Birkhead, ed. , Administrative Problems in Pakistan (New York:
Syracuse University Press ,1966) pp. 4S-49.
7Gustav Papanek, Pakistan's Develo pment , Social Goals and Private
Incentives, pp. 160.
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labour days, 3,3 50 cubic feet o£ earth was moved, and 58,000
labourers
were given work.
Gustav Papanek of the Harvard Advisory Group attached with Pakistan's
Planning Commission for a number of years writing about the works program
states:
The effect on agriculture is difficult to demonstrate
in quantative terms. Agricultural output in West Pakistan
reached unprecedent levels in 1963-1964 and remained high
in 1964-1965. Those close to works programme consider it
a significant factor in this performance. Some of the added
income was used to reduce indebtedness, and heavy debt burden
is widely regarded as discouraging to increased output. They
argue that the works programme added to rural purchasing
power, some of which went to agricultural inputs; that the
expanded rural road network reduced the price of inputs,
improved the. prices received by farmers and encouraged
production for the market. The enbankments constructed
under the programme alone were significant contributions
to production. 7
There were other advantages of the Works Program, which should be
mentioned now. The Works Program revitilized the union councils and gave
them something purposeful to do. For the first time, the union councils
were effectively enlisted in an important, massive development effort.
New leadership developed; local government officials had a new sense of
purpose.
10
According to Rahman's evaluation report of 1963-1964, 17,456
project committees were formed, 11 with four to five people in each commit-
tee. Considering all these people engaged actively, in the developmental
activities, this perhaps is one of the best ways to involve the people in
8A. T. Rahman, An Evaluation of Works Programme 1963-1964 , p. 8.
^Papanek, op_. cit .
,
p. 161.
10Gustav Papanek, Pakistan's Development , Social Goals and Private
Incentives
, p. 161.
nA. T. Rahman, An Evaluation of Works Programme in East Pakistan
1953-1964, p. SO.
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the development process and thus bring them nearer to the
government and
to the political system. An element of planning from the
grassroots up
has started. In a country like Pakistan, Which relies on central plan-
ning, and wants its population to participate in the whole planning
process, the Works Programme could be, perhaps, the best means to acquaint
the people with planning, and make them aware of national policies and
national goals.
Though there are many advantages of the .7 rks Program, there are,
however, some criticisms as well, which, too, should be considered. These
are: the forks Program is negating the principles of self-help and self-
government. It is argued that the B.D. councils should raise their own
12
taxes to carry out development from their resources. Since the union
councillors are not technically trained, most of the projects constructed
are of poor quality. There is a necessity to provide technical assistance
in preparing the schemes, especially when more sophisticated schemes are
now being considered.
13 There is no provision of maintenance in the works
program. The project once completed is left there. Arrangements should
be made that either the union councils should take up the maintenance
work, and be given additional funds to carry on this task, or the completed
projects should be handed over to the regular departments for maintenance
work.
12Lawrence Ziring, "The Administration of Basic Democracies", in
Guthrie Birkhead, ed. , Administrative Problems in Pakistan , p. 50.
13 Third Five Year Plan
,
p. 512.
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Some of these disadvantages are not complicated and could easily be
corrected. The government instead of granting the money out-right, should
match its funds with some free labour contributions from the villagers.
The fact is that villagers are so poor and debt-ridden that they do not
have much of a tax base. The only effective way they can help is by
their willingness to pay the partial cost of the projects by contributing
free labour. The major drawback, however, is non-availibility of the
technical personnel who could help in the preparation, execution and
supervision of the projects. This could be corrected by stationing the
qualified people at the thana training and development centers (described
below). Disadvantages, notwithstanding, the Works Program has been a
blessing for all concerned. In Papanek's view:
The success of East Pakistan Uorks Programme provides
further evidence that a peasant society is not completely
stagnant and tradition bound. In Pakistan the government
was able to mobilize and organize the peasants to participate
in change. The works program also showed that the government
can carry out a massive program to develop the rural infra-
structure by working through the existing institutions. This
effort, the works programme of East Pakistan may be the major
contribution to economic development techniques which Pakistan
has made.
Having considered the agricultural problems of East Pakistan, and
relating them to the Basic Democracies, it is appropriate to consider
some new approaches towards agriculture development in Cast Pakistan.
Gustav Papanek, Pakistan's Development
,
Social Goals and Private
Incen tives
, pp. 159-160.
CHAPTER V
APPROACHES TO AGRICULTURE DEVELOPMENT IN EAST PAKISTAN
Two new approaches to developing agriculture have been introduced
in East Pakistan. One is called the "Hymens ingh Approach" and the other
is known as the "Comilla Approach."
The Hymens ingh Approach
The "Mymensingh Approach" is an attempt by the East Pakistan Agricul-
ture Department to show that it is possible to increase agriculture pro-
duction by using the existing staff of the Agriculture Department at the
village and thana level. Few unions of each thana in the Mymensingh
district, however, have been selected for the experimentation. According
to this plan, a "block farm" of about 700 acres is established in each of
the unions. All the land in the block belongs to the individual farmers.
The farmers consent to cooperate in carrying out the instructions and
work under the union agriculture assistants and thana agriculture officers,
The union assistants show the farmers how to water, sow, weed, and what
kind of seeds and fertilizer to use; the farmer carries out these instruc-
tions and after the harvest, farmers are provided adequate storage facili-
ties. They are told when and where to sell the crops. In 1968, when the
crops were harvested on the block farms, the results were extremely good.
The output per acre of paddy rose fourfold from 1640 pounds to 6560
pounds per acre on some block farms.
Pakistan Times (Lahore) May 13, 1968, p. 5, cols, 1-3,
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The idea behind the Hymens ingh experiment is to show to the Earners
that if they follow the correct agriculture practices, it is possible to
raise their income and yields. Moreover, while working under the agri-
culture assistants, they not only learn to acquire better agriculture
practices, but they also do the work on their own land. When the farmer
sees the results of his own work, he should have little difficulty in
convincing himself and his neighbouring farmers in the villages that there
are better methods which bring better results and which could improve
their lot. In theory, therefore, this approach anticipates an ever-
widening demonstration effect. However, the Mymensingh Approach is still
at the experimental stage and has not been spread to other districts.
The Comilla Approach
The "Comilla Approach" is more comprehensive and more ambitious.
Initially, this experiment was started for the benefit of agriculture,
but it has proved beneficial to non-agriculturists as well.
The Comilla experiment was started in Comilla Kotwali Thana by the
director of the Pakistan Academy for Rural Development at Comilla, East
Pakistan, in 1961. The experiment at Comilla was started to find a solu-
tion or solutions for the decaying village cooperatives. The chief aim
with respect of size and structure of the new cooperative system was to
find a way out for small village agriculture cooperatives and "multi-
purpose" cooperatives which, lacking in social and psychological cohesion,
were gradually weakening and decaying.
^Aziz Khan, A. New Rural Co-operative Systen for Comilla Thana , Fifth
Annual Report (Comilla: Pakistan Academy for ^ural Development, 1966)
p. 3., hereafter cited as Fifth Annual leport.
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The Comilla Approach is an attempt to organize small village-based
cooperatives, known as primary cooperative societies. The primary
society on the village level receives credit, technological, marketing,
consumer, etc., support from its parent body, known as the Central Coopera-
tive Society, which has its headquarters in the Thana Development and
Training Center (described below) at the Thana headquarters.
Before we proceed further, let me explain the structure and functions
of a Thana Training Development Center (hereafter referred to as a TTDC).
The TTDC is a collection of physical facilities where all the govern-
ment officials of the "National Building Departments" attached with the
thana council have their offices. As mentioned above, the offices of the
Central Co-operative Association Societies are also located here. A bank,
workshop and a depot, agriculture implements, etc., are also situated here.
In addition, classrooms and space for instructing the farmers and other
The idea of the thana training and development center is not a new
one. A center like a TTDC has existed in Taiwan for many years. It is
interesting to note that while Akhter Hamead Khan and his associates were
thinking of establishing the TTDC at Comilla, Professor William 3oyer,
then on an AID program in Lahore ifest Pakistan, wrote and suggested an
"integrated scheme" so organized as to, "embrace the entire life and
activities of the cultivators for their general economic development.
Physically, a center could be located within the bullock-cart distance of
each village. Where union council areas embrace too many villages to
accord with the measure, they could be organized into more units so that
council headquarters could be made a part of the center. The center could
serve as the cooperative credit society headquarters and land revenue
could be administered from there, thus replacing the village lambard-ir
and patwari. The center could have storage facilities for seed and
fertilizer, warehouses and marketing facilities, agricultural extension
facilities and possibly a police substation and consolidated schools.
Thus would be created a primary unit larger than the village and usually
smaller than the present union council area at the locus of which would
be a center comprising the headquarters of all essential services needed
by the cultivator."
William ']. Boyer, "Integrating Credit vLtti-other Agricultural Services",
The NIPA Reporter, Karachi, Vol. II (Jan-April, 1963) pp. 9-10.
6k
villagers, are also provided.
The idea behind the TTDC is that all the government officials could
be utilized more profitably. Instead of the government officials going
into the villages, the idea is to let the villagers, or their representa-
tives, come to the center for not only obtaining needed credit and ser-
vices (this would become clear when the function of primary and central
associations are explained in more detail), but also the villagers could
be trained to use better and proven methods for agriculture development.
At the same time with the villagers at the center, could be taught better
hygenic methods, family planning methods, etc . etc . All the training at
the center is provided free of cost by the trained government officials.
In James Hendry's view:
The TTDC offers the government an administrative arrange-
ment through which an extension work can be carried out and the
material resources for development can be introduced into the
agricultural sector. If as a policy matter, it is accepted as
the basic pattern for organizing development activities in the
agriculture sector, if could make significant contribution
toward agricultural output in the years ahead.
The TTDC's were to work under the general supervision of circle
officer. It was proposed that thirty TTDCs be constructed under the
works program and opened in 1964-1965 and that the whole province of
6
East Pakistan should have a TTDC in each Thana by 1970.
^Cbaidullah Khan, "Rural Development and Administration, He-organi-
zation", Journal of PAHP
,
Vol. IV (April, 1964) p. 197.
^James Hendry, then advisor to planning commission, Dacca, "Working
paper on Thana Training and Development Center", submitted to the East
Pakistan government May, 1963, reproduced by Akhter llameed Khan and
Zakir Hussain, F ifth Annual Report
,
appendix c.
^Akhter llameed Khan and Zakir Hussain, Fifth Annual Report
, p. 15.
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Comilla Approach to Agriculture Development or a
New Cooperative System
As has been mentioned earlier, the cooperative societies had not
made much progress in 2ast Pakistan. Indeed, their number had gone down.
On the other hand, Akhter Hameed Khan and his associates at Comilla are
convinced that, if the villages in East Pakistan are to progress, some
sort of cooperative structure must be evolved, which would take the past
mistakes of the old cooperatives in view, and try to evolve some system
which would be dynamic and meet all the needs of the farmer, not just
credit, as was the general practice of old cooperatives. But, above all,
the Comilla groups hopes:
To overcome despair and defeats by bringing together the
active, the energetic and the purposeful, taking them out of
the stagnant village repeatedly and putting them into contact
with each other and with experts, thus making them receptive
to new ideas and aspirations.
The Comilla cooperatives comprise a two tiered structure, the primary
society at the village level (not at the union level). The primary agri-
culture society is formed in a village by the farmers. The members of the
primary society who number between 50 and 100 persons, before they can be
accepted by the central association, must agree to comply scrupulously with
the conditions of the central association. These are: to organize the
primary society and later become a registered cooperative society, to hold
weekly meetings with compulsory attendance of all members, and to select
a trusted man from the group and send him to a TTDC. He would act as an
"Organizer" and leader of the group, keep proper and complete accounts,
in order for the group to formulate a joint production plan, to agree to
7
Ibid.
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spend the credit money under supervision and advice of central society,
to adopt improved agricultural practices and skills, to make regular
cash and in kind saving deposits, to join the central society, to hold
regular member education discussions, to agree to attend adult literary
classes and agree to send their children to muktab schools (mosque
schools).
The primary society, as mentioned, must select an organizer or man-
ager of the society from their own members, select a "model farmer" and
nominate an "Imam'* teacher to teach in the mosque schools. The manager
of the primary society is the key man; the success of the primary society
depends on his enthusiasm and support. His main functions are: to teach
the members of his primary society new social and economic modes, to take
charge of the planning and pooling of capital for crop production, to
arrange for the joint market of the members, to rent farm machinery
from the central cooperative association (hereafter referred to as CCA)
for the joint use of the members of the primary society, and most import-
ant of all :
He is the bridge between the dynamism of the central
association and the conservatism of village customs. He is
the constant transmitter of new ideas. Without an able or-
ganizer a village remains an amorphous mass. We know many
villagers are eager to adopt cooperation, but unable to do
so as they cannot find an organizer. Again the performance
of the group often, though not always, is related to the
quality of the organizer.
The manager is paid by CCA on a commission basis. He is given, 0.50
paisa (100 paisas equal to 1 Rupee) per member attending the weekly meeting
8Aziz Khan, Fifth Annual Report , p. 4.
9Akhter Hameed Khan and Zakir Hussain, Third Annual Report, p. 17,
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of the society and depositing the money regularly, 0.50 paisa per acre,
brought under improved cultivation, one percent of the loan realization
. . .
10
and ^s 15 per month for organizing tube well water for irrigation.
The manager of the primary society attends the monthly meeting of the
managers of the CCA headquarters. The manager calls a compulsory weekly
meeting of the primary society to prepare production plans, to ask the
members about their loan requirements from CCA. The loan plans are
checked by field supervision section of the CCA, and if the plans are
approved, the village cooperative gets the loan from the bank at TTDC.
The model farmer, selected by the primary society, goes for train-
ing to the TTDC every week until he is trained. And then monthly after-
wards, during these monthly meetings at the thana development center,
he is taught by the agriculture staff in new methods of cultivation,
plant protection, etc. The model farmer's other functions are: to
ascertain the reaction of the members and keep his teachers informed
at CCA, to help the members in adopting improved methods and provide
for their field guidance, to secure supplies of insecticides and sprays,
to organize pest control measures, to bring soil samples to the labora-
tory at CCA and get recommendations on doses of fertilizers, to secure
12
expert advice on crop diseases, etc. In short, the model farmer is
an extension agent of a new cooperative system. This extension agent
.is known to the farmers and is from the same village, and is not sent
from outside and is not alien to the village people.
10Fifth Annual Report
, p. 27.
Obaidullah Khan , op. cit.
,
p. 196,
12Fifth Annual Report
, p. 50.
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Since 1965, village agriculture centers have been constructed in the
villages for giving training to the farmers by the model farmers. It has
thus become possible to train an increased number of farmers within their
13
own village.
It has been known to the leaders of the Cortilla experiment that
"general illiteracy is a great impediment to progress." Therefore, they
decided in 1963 that they would require the members of the primary soci-
eties to learn to read and write simple Bengali, and agree to send their
children to the school. To economize, the organizers of Gomilla experi-
ment have employed the existing village mosques and their Imam (those
who lead the Muslim prayer). The Imam who have considerable social
status, and weak financial support got a new boost. The members of the
primary societies agreed to pay for the Imam's nominal salary. The CCA
undertook to instruct 120 Imam's (nominated by the primary societies) at
the Thana Development Centers. The Imams went once a week for a year
in 1963 to the TTDC to acquire new knowledge and to learn teaching
techniques. The result of this effort has been that within one year,
schools, with an enrollment of five thousand children and one thousand
adults, have been started, and
"this program of universal literacy within a few years, its low
cost, and enthusiasm which it evokes in the villages, holds out
a great promise. The cost of training 120 Imams one day a week
for a year does not exceed fifteen thousand rupees." 1 ^
13 lb id
. , p. 27.
*^Third Annual Report, p. 19.
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Central Cred it Cooperative Association - CCA.
The second tier of the Comilla Approach is the Central Credit Coop-
erative Association. This most powerful of the two tiers is located at
the thana level in the Thar.a Development Center (TTDC).
The Central Association has a management committee of 12 elected
members from the primary societies (three of whom retire every year),
and six non elected members nominated by the provincial government's
registrar of the cooperative societies who also nominates the chairman
of the Central Association. Though at present, the management committee
has nominated members to "guide" the farmers, it is hoped later on, that
the whole management committee, including the chairman, would comprise
elected members from the primary societies. While the management com-
mittee decides the general policy matters, the day-to-day administration
is carried out by the project-director and his staff appointed by the
management committee. Tne Central Association maintains a field staff
of accountants, supervisors, and inspectors who keep the accounts, super-
vise the work of managers, model farmers and the general progress of the
primary societies.
To carry out the work of the Association, the CCA has various sec-
tions each with its own head, and all under one project-director. The
sections of the Comilla Central Association are: Loan and rural credit,
marketing and processing, field supervision, machines and maintenance,
agriculture extension, water development, imports, accounts and audit,
15Fifth_ Annual Report
, p. 20.
16 Ibid.
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stores, creamery and small industrial plant (cold storage and rice mills).
There are four main functions of the central association. These
are: to provide banking and credit facilities,^ to provide all service
and training facilities to its members including storage and hiring out
of agriculture implements like tractors, power pumps, thrashers, etc.;
to provide marketing facilities, which include, organizing, the joint
sale of the produce and purchasing of consumer goods for the members of
the primary societies; and to operate and manage small industrial units
like cold storage plants and rice mills , where the members can store
perishable agriculture products, like potatoes and vegetables, and where
paddy can be husked. And whenever possible, these industrial units engage
in the business, too, the profits from which go to the members of the
primary societies.
The Working of the Central Assoc iation
I. Credit
The CCA advances to its members various types of loans, such as:
production loans, in-kind grain loans, loans for the purchase of milk
cows, loans for release of mortgaged land, loans for construction of
houses, loans for installation of tube wells, loans against pledged
paddy and rice, loans for purchase of machinery, and loans for market-
19ing operations. To be eligible for obtaining credit, the member has
to deposit a minimum of six paisa a week in the bank at the TTDC; the
17 I.bid.
, p. 21.
18
Third Annual Report, pp. 2
19 Ibid., p. 57.
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working principal of CCA is, "no deposit, no credit." The CCA staff
scrutinizes the scheme to determine whether the loan given would enable
the borrower to:
produce more, earn more, save more, deposit more, invest more,
eliminate the dangers of usury, become dynamic element in the
credit, investment and production pattern of rural economy.
-
If these criteria of lending the money are met, then the loan is
given to the indivudual farmer. A joint loan is given to the primary
society if the CCA is satisfied that primary society in question meets
the criteria laid down by CCA—these Criteria are: producing the evi-
dence that members of the society have been making deposits in cash or
kind. A production plan, showing the use of the amount asked for. A
proof that the primary society has an elected and TTDC trained manager,
21
who has been performing his duties competently. The proper use of the
credit is constantly stressed and checked by the field staff of CCA. If
the credit is used for renting of the machinery or other supplies, the
machinery and the supplies are given to the primary society, from the
stores and machine shops of the CCA and the money is credited to the
primary society. Money is later repaid by the primary society to the CCA.
2. Marketing
The marketing section of the CCA, studies the market prices and
provides marketing information to the primary societies, finds out the
best available price, arranges for the bulk purchase of consumer goods,
and the supply of the same to the member cooperatives at wholesale price,
20nFifth Annual Report, p. 33.
^Obaidullah Khan, "Rural Development and Administration Reorgani-
zation", Journal of PARD, Comilla, Vol. II (Jan. -April 1963) p. 196.
72
etc. 22
3. Farm Machinery
The CCA maintains a machine shop at its headquarters. The tractors
are rented by the primary societies from the CCA. All the maintenance
and repairs are also carried out by the engineers and mechanics of the
CCA. The other supplies and services, like sinking of tube wells and
providing rice thrashers and power life-pumps, are also rented out to
23
the farmers by the machines section.
4. Small Industrial Units
The small industrial unit section was started at Comilla in 1964-
1965, when it was realized by the marketing section that wholesale buy-
ing and supplying the consumer goods to the primary society members did
not allow them to compete with the existing village shopkeepers. Instead,
it was thought it would be better to process some essential goods, and
then sell the goods to the members on a nominal profit basis. Tne chief
aspects of this new approach are to process and store some essential
goods, and supply and sell these goods to the members and non members.
Up until 1964-65, a rice factory, a cold storage plant to store vegetables,
potato seed, fruits, etc., have been constructed at Comilla to meet the
needs of the members and to provide additional jobs and income opportuni-
24
ties for the members.
Evaluation of the Comi 11a Approach
There are several implications of the Comilla Approach which deserve
95
""Third Annual Report, p. 73.
Fifth Annual Report
,
p. 71.
24Fifth Annual Report, p. 13.
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attention. Ihe new cooperative system is completely
different from the
old cooperative structure existing in East Pakistan, instead
of the three-
tiered it is two tiered structure, with the central association
being more
powerful of the two. Unlike the old method, the new method not
only pro-
vides the credit but it requires that the members must save and
deposit
regularly to be elgible for the credit. The credit so provided, is
not
given blindly, but the utilization of credit is watched carefully and
supervised closely. Unlike the old method, where no thana development
centers existed, the new approach makes it possible for the farmers to
learn new methods in agriculture. Through thana development centers,
the
government officials become active participants. An attempt is being made
to integrate marketing with the credit, and to meet all the consumer
needs,
A new dimension of the Comilla approach is that it is trying to
bring small-scale industry into the villages. Though still in its
initial stages, this method of introducing small-scale industry has many
potentialities. It could revive the dormant village cottage industry
with the help of the provincial cottage industry corporation and the
CCA marketing section. By bringing small-scale industries, the villages
will not only get additional employment and income, but will be intro-
duced to a "new way of life."
By pressuring the farmers to attend the adult literacy classes and
•to send their children to mosque schools, a cheap and easy method has
been found to tackle the massive illiteracy problem in Pakistan.
The Comilla cooperative system unlike the old cooperative method
has achieved remarkable success with non-agricultural and urban societies.
Starting in 1963-64, non agricultural primary societies have been formed
by the people with diverse occupations, like butchers, rickshaw drivers,
7k
etc., and for the first time the poor people of small towns like
Comilla,
have found a new hope and meaning in life. The non agricultural coopera-
tives are forging ahead, their members seem to be more virile, dynamic
and adventurous than agriculture societies. Within this short period
of
their joining in the movement, "the rickshaw pullers have become the
owners of rickshaws, the motor drivers have become the owners of buses,
and the press workers of presses.*'" The number of non agricultural
societies in 1964-55 in Comilla, was 2k with 1215 members and their
deposit in the bank was about Rs. 500,000 (U.S. $100 ,000).
Leaving the non agricultural societies aside, how has the new coop-
erative method fared in providing credit, marketing facilities and other
services? The major need of agriculture in East Pakistan is the avail-
ability of rural credit. During the past, it has not been possible to
build a viable system of rural credit in East Pakistan for many reasons,
the chief being the absence of a banking habit among the farmers. They
did not make any deposits. How can there be credit without repayment?
The majority of farmers, on account of their meagre savings, did not
appear attractive risks to bankers. The establishment of an agriculture
development bank does not solve the problem of credit repayment by the
farmers; it merely evades the issue by dealing only with large-scale
farmers. 27 In the new cooperative system, supervision is never relaxed;
each society's record of deposits is watched every xveek; its production
plans are scrutinized; its use of the loan is studied; and unrelenting
25
Ibid
. ,
p. 91-92.
26 Ibid.
27 Third Annual Report, p. 22.
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pressure is exerted for punctual repayment of the loan. The inspector
of CCA deeps up-to-date information about latest agriculture techniques
and discusses it in the weekly training meetings of the organizers. It
is now evident that organizers (or the managers) of the society, trained
by the Central Association, and acting as its agents, can easily collect
savings and loans. Savings and repayments were the missing links, in the
no
chain of rural credit. By saving and depositing the money regularly in
easily an accessible bank, the farmers had accumulated ^s. 100,000 (U.S.
29
$20,000) in small deposits, in a year and half time in Comilla thana.
The CCA charges 12% to 157o interest on its loans as compared to 60%
30
to 100,o interest charged by the money lenders. CCA loan collection was
31
"over 997j with nearly 5% collateral in cash or kind generally maintained."
One interesting aspect of the credit structure of the CCA is that a com-
mercial bank (United bank) located in the thana development center is dir-
ectly involved in the CCA credit operations, in that the managers of the
primary societies bring the farmers savings and deposits in the bank.
The bank issues pass books to each of the members showing his weekly
balance. It is hoped by the leaders of the Commilla Approach that, by
bringing a commercial bank nearer the villagers, it will induce banking
and saving habits in the villagers and will prove to the bank owners
that it is profitable to engage in business with villagers.
The marketing section of CCA arranges for the storage of the harvested
25 Ibid
., p. 23.
29 Ibid.
, p. 24,
30Ibid.
, p. 33.
31 Ibid.
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rice of the villagers in the village goales (warehouses) and for the joint
sale of members' crops. This section also buys the consumer goods at
wholesale prices for the members. It has been found that if a small
farmer adds 307;, to his income as producer, by cooperative marketing, he
can at least save 10% of his expenditure by cooperating as a consumer.
Without cooperative marketing, "he sells fourth cheaper and buys fourth
dearer.
"
J -
The marketing section started a consumer subsection in 1962-63. The
consumer goods are purchased by their subsection, on wholesale, and resold
to "dealers" appointed by the primary societies who sell consumer goods
to the members on credit, if need be. In the first year alone, the total
transaction of the consumer subsection was Rs. 4000,000 (U.S. $99,000).
Mechanised farming has not been successful in Comilla because, as
mentioned above, the farm holdings are too small to use tractors economi-
cally. Besides, ordinary tractors are hard to use for wet cultivation.
Some scope exists for the use of tractors in the winter crops, when the
land is hard and the ordinary plough cannot do the job. As a result, the
tractors of the machine section most of the time have remained idle,
except for hauling goods and suppli to and from the market.
The extension work of CCA is ; through the model farmer of the
primary society who goes to the ± a month for training and in-
structions and on his return d e.w methods and instructions with
the members of his society, ? .sekly meeting of the society. The
model farmer in effect is a as ion agent of CCA who belongs to the
32
Ibid.
,
p. 27,
33 Ibid,
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same village and is known by the people of the village. Since the intro-
duction of model farmers, 24 union agriculture assistants of agriculture
department have been withdrawn from Comilla thana. How effective is the
model farmer? Comilla leaders claim that up until 1962 more than fifteen
hundred farmers adopted new practices in agriculture and raised their farm
35production by 50/a, and that the average yield of paddy in the Comilla
thana rose from 20 maunds to 3 7.6 maunds. In a survey conducted by the
Comilla Academy, it was found that 607o of the members of the primary
societies followed 50/i of the instructions of the model farmers in one
36
year.
Comilla experiment, promising as it is, has some drawbacks and
problems. The total expenditure of the Central Association of Comilla
for four years up until 1964-65 was Is. 70 million (U.S. $14 million),
or an average expenditure of Is. 17.5 million ($3.5 million), and the
total (fixed and current) liabilities of the Association were Rs. 85
million ($17 million). 7 To initiate the work of CCA, the provincial
cooperative department gave Rs. 4.5 million for a 5-year period to the
Central Association to start its functions; Rs. 3 million was given as
loan and the remainder as grant. The Ford Foundation up until 1963, had
3 8contributed $135,000. Most of this money went for buying machinery,
tractors, etc. It takes at least four to five years for a central
34 .
Ibid
. , p. 18.
3 5 Ibid
.
, p. 9.
36 Tbid., p. 51.
37Fifth Annual R eport
, see. Appendix C.
38 Ibid.
,
p. 9.
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cooperative association to become self-supporting. Thus, initially, funds
from outside will have to be made available, if the Comilla Approach is
to be adopted in the province. A second problem, faced by the Comilla
leaders, is that the farmers join the. primary societies and pledge to
conform to the rules and regulations, out of sheer necessity, because
they are in deep debt and have no other way to go. Once their pressing
debt requirements are met, their loyalty to the Association decreases.
They deposit only a bare minimum in the bank. They don't attend the
weekly meetings regularly; they accept the joint production plans but
rarely participate in them. In some cases, the members, after solving
their debt problems and earning enough money drop out altogether, and
3 9become money lenders themselves.
These shortcomings notwithstanding, the Pakistan Government, en-
couraged by the Comilla experiment, sanctioned in 1965 a sum of Rs. 49.61
(U.S. $9.6 million) for the expansion of the Comilla program in the re-
maining thanas of the Comilla district by 1970. At time of this writing,
41
eight thanas of Comilla district, have the Comilla type cooperatives.
Besides the Comilla district, Comilla type cooperatives have been
working since 1963, in the thanas of Govipore, Baibandha and Thakourgaon
subdivision of the Mymensingh district, Rangpur district, and Rajshahi
district respectively. The Kashimper agricultural development estate of
EPADC (East Pakistan Agriculture Development Corporation) also has a
39
Ibid.
, pp. 29-30.
^°Third Five Year Plan
,
p. 443.
Information given to author by Akhter Hameed Khan, in a letter
from Comilla, dated August 7, 1963 (see Appendix A).
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Comilla type cooperative.
The government of East Pakistan evidently has decided to expand the
Comilla type cooperatives in the whole of 2ast Pakistan as soon as pos-
43
sible. However, progress so far has been slow.
42
Ibid.
43Fifth Annual Report, p. 101
CONCLUSION
Food problem in Sast Pakistan is urgent and serious. There are far
too many people and too little land. The average land holdings do not
exceed more than three acres. The output of rice per acre is four times
lower than that of Formosa and Japan.
Ninety-five percent of East Pakistan's population is rural, depend-
ing on agriculture for their livelihood. Should Pakistan fail to solve
the hunger problems of these millions of people there would always be
danger to the peace, political stability and therefore danger to the
whole country. The problems of East Pakistan's poverty will not improve
until the condition of agriculture improves.
Land reform is usually given a top priority by governments of the
developing countries. Somehow, it is assumed by new national leaders
that land reform is a -natural corollary to independence, as if land re-
form in itself will solve all inequities. The reasoning is thus: con-
centration of ownership of most of the land in a few people's hands is bad.
Therefore, there should be land distribution with land given to the
tillers. But must there be a land reform which does not provide for
credit, marketing and other facilities and capital formation and leads
to further uneconomical land holdings? How is the ignorant farmer going
to feed himself and his Asian style family of five to six children, and
Akhter Haraeed Khan, quoted by Obaidullah Khan and Arthur Raper,
Comilla-AID Conference Report, p. 6.
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save enough to reinvest in the land, for the increased productivity? And
what happens when he dies? Will his three acres be divided further among
his sons and their sons? Will not children be even more worse off than
was he?
Land reform in Sast Pakistan was not counter productive in itself.
What was negative about it was the fact that land reforai did not provide
for credit to buy bullocks, fertilizer, etc. It did not provide for
minimum ceilings as did West Pakistan's land reform; and it did not pro-
vide for personnel to aid and help illiterate farmers.
Up until 1953-54, when a major drought hit the country, the govern-
ment of Pakistan and Sast Pakistan completely neglected agriculture and
did not have any policy for agriculture development except an empty
slogan of "grow more food" which was plastered all over in the villages.
How to "grow more food" was not the government's concern.
To meet the food emergency in 1953-54, the government received Ameri-
can aid under PL-4S0. After that, like a person living on dope, the
government forgot about its food plan, and introduced without much think-
ing, a procurement policy which left farmers with very few if any incen-
tives. The government fixed prices, below market prices and ordered the
deputy commissioners of the districts to procure the grain which was
stored at the government warehouses and brought out in the market accord-
ing to the need when the prices rose.
Meanwhile, Sast Pakistan, after the 1954 elections, was completely
caught up in political chaos and had three different governments (until
Ayub's October revolution) and one governor's rule for a year. Political
stability at the national level was equally lacking (five governments
between 1955-1958). The planning board recognized in its first five
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year plan (not published until 195S) the dangers of deteriorating con-
ditions in agriculture and for the first time gave top priority to the
agricultural development. Because of the unstable political situation
in East Pakistan and in the central government, the first five year plan
program of development received scant attention of the provincial and
central governments. The overall rate of growth in agriculture during
the first plan was 1.3%, and the growth rate in food grains was barely
1% while the population grew at 2.6% in the country.
The new military regime of Ayub Khan, which came to power in October
195S, launched the second five year plan in 1960. This plan again empha-
sized the importance of agriculture. During the second plan, the govern-
ment of Pakistan, under its dynamic head, President Ayub Khan, gave
serious attention to t he development of agriculture in Pakistan—by sub-
sidizing fertilizer and improving the distribution of fertilizer, by pro-
viding better seeds, and because of the fortune for time of good weather,
the production in agriculture rose considerably in both wings of the coun-
try. The value of crop output in East Pakistan grew by about 203, in the
five year period of the plan. And by the end of the. plan period in 1965,
Pakistan did achieve self-sufficiency in food, and the government pro-
claimed that Pakistan had achieved a breakthrough in the agriculture.
The fact of the matter was that Pakistan got a breathing spell in 1965
.because of the good weather. Though fertilizer helped in the agriculture
yields, the total area, however, under fertilizer was not more than 10%.
2 Malik Khuda 3ux, "Strategy for the Conquest of Hunger", p. 7,
3 Third Five Year Man, p. 396.
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In June 1965 the third plan was launched with much fanfare, with great
enthusiasm and hope. But the very first year of the plan found Pakistan
in many difficulties. Because of the September war in 1965 with India,
Pakistan had to divert considerable development funds to defense. Consor-
tium aid to Pakistan did not provide "any funds to Pakistan in 1965 for
development. But worst of all drought hit the country and continued
until the end of 1966. The result was that agriculture production fell
considerably, and Pakistan had to import as never before, Rs. 100 crores
(U.S. $200 million) worth of food grains.
Because of failing agriculture output the industrial sector of the
economy also suffered—the overall economic growth declined from 6% in
1965 to 4.67= in 1965-1966. The planners in Pakistan had hoped that by
the end of the third plan, Pakistan would make an entrance in the "Steel
and Heavy Industry Age" and make a start in the production of capital
goods. But because of defense and agriculture requirements, the whole
strategy of the third plan had to be revised. Defense was given the
first priority and agriculture the second. The government of Pakistan
vowed that Pakistan would achieve self-sufficiency in food by 1970.
By the summer of 1968, because of good weather for two years, in-
creasing use of fertilizers and tube wells, and utilization of good and
improved varieties of rice and wheat seeds and increased use of tube
wells in West Pakistan, the food position in Pakistan seemed to be
comfortable. And in 1968, West Pakistan for the first time in fifteen
years was not required to import any wheat. But East Pakistan was
Sarfraz Aziz, head of the Internationil Section of the Pakistan
Planning Commission, quoted in Pakistan News Digest , Sept. 1, 1968,
p. 1.
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still short of self -sufficiency by 1.5 million tons of rice. The govern-
ment hopes that East Pakistan would also attain self-sufficiency in
1970-
1971. Meanwhile, the government of Pakistan is again beating the drums
of an imposing "breakthrough" in agriculture. As past experience shows,
there seems to be a strong correlation of increased food production to
eood weather. The real breakthrough will not come until Pakistan finds
that it can withstand adverse weather—and that Pakistan's farmers con-
tinue to adopt new methods and techniques—and Pakistan's agriculture
scientists, among other things, provide the country with more improved
seeds.
Given the above picture of agriculture in East Pakistan, what role
have Basic Democracy Councils played in the development of agriculture
in Bast Pakistan? The Basic Democracy Councils, have as it should be
apparent by now, played very little direct role in the development of
agriculture in East Pakistan, the major reason being that historically
these local councils (union boards) had never engaged in agriculture
development. Sural development was thought to be synonymous with the
public works—building cf roads, dikes, etc. The Village AID Program,
which was supposed to have concentrated on agriculture, did not perform
well. At any rate, the Village AID Program, was never integrated with
the existing union boards in East Pakistan. The union boards never
received any orientation towards agriculture. Consequently, the public
works tradition cf the Union Boards was carried into the Union Councils.
Though the Union Councils have not engaged directly in agriculture
development, but by carrying out massive works program in East Pakistan--
Such as building dikes on a large scale, clearing up numerous choked-up
water wavs and water channels of East. Pakistan, and by improving and
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building new roads, the Basic Democracy Councils through the works pro-
gram have nevertheless aided the agriculture development. Indeed, it can
be said that the works program has given a meaning and purpose to these
Councils.
Many observers have criticized the works program on the grounds
that the works program is negation of the concept of self help and self
government in that the money for the works program comes from the top
and is not raised through taxation by the union councils. This may be
true, but the fact remains that the villagers with meager income cannot
be taxed high enough to carry out any meaningful development work. Other-
wise, the Basic Democracy Councils would have no meaningful development
work to perform.
In a country like Pakistan, where "aids and grants" are given yearly
and regularly to the two provinces by the central government, and where
the Central Government aids the cities by building directly giant utility
plants, like nuclear power plant for Karachi, why then should not the
Central Government also provide aid and assistance for its majority of
people living in the rural side? If the ?tate cannot or should not help
80% of its citizens living in the countryside, what than, it may be asked,
is the proper function of such a state and what is the use and meaning of
being independent and a developing country? The western theories of self
help and self rule are almost non-applicable in the developing countries
of today. In Pakistan and many developing countries, where there is
central planning, and where there is an accent in modernization and
development, it is incomprehensible to think that villages will develop
on their own meager resources. And why should the national government
build industries, build roads, etc. in or near the cities and leave
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majority of the people in misery in the villages?
The results of such a policy will be an increasing gulf between the
cities and villages, creation of an educated and politically articulate
elite in the cities and the persistence of an ignorant mass of people in
the villages, bifurcation of the political culture, participant political
culture in the cities, and a subjective political culture in the rural
areas. If the works program were to be withdrawn, another advantage
would be lost, that of bringing the individual illiterate farmer closer
to the national political system. In a traditional society such as in
Pakistan, where the loyalties are stronger to the village, caste and
province, and where the villager is hardly aware of the government, state
or the nation—the works program by mobilizing thousands of villagers and
farmers not only provides development and economic compensations, but
also brings the village people closer to the governmental process and
gives them a sense of awareness and belonging to a nation.
Also an indirect assistance of the Basic Democracy Councils to
agriculture in East Pakistan has been through the Thana Councils. The
headquarters, and the government personnel of the Thana Councils, have
now become the nucleus of a new effort of organizing a new comprehensive
system of cooperatives in East Pakistan. Given the average size of the
farms, the lack of capital among farmers to improve and adopt new tech-
nology, lack of a good marketing system, etc., the Comilla Approach
appears a realistic way and perhaps the main hope of developing agricul-
ture, undermining traditionalism and initiating change among the farmers
of East Pakistan. It is with respect to The Comilla Approach that I feel
the Union Councils could do more. They, for instance, could utilize the
works program funds to build agriculture warehouses and agriculture and
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village training centers, where the staff from TTDC's could come from
time to time to teach the farmers not only new methods in agriculture,
but also in health, birth control practices, education, handicrafts, etc.
At any rate, the problems of agriculture development in East Pakistan are
serious and critical that its development cannot and should not be left
to the Union Councils alone. By the time the 1968 report of the Agricul-
ture Commission was published, the government under President Ayub Khan,
whatever hopes it had in Basic Democracies, realized that agriculture
development was too serious a problem to be left with the Basic Democracies.
The government decided wisely to create Agriculture Development Corpora-
tions, and initiated new agriculture policies, which bore fruit by the end
of the second five year plan in 1965.
Even though the Basic Democracy councils have given indirect and
marginal support in agriculture development, and probably would continue
to do so in the foreseeable future, they still perform other vital func-
tions, which should not go unnoticed by a student of political science.
In a country like Pakistan, where the political parties are not well
organized and hardly reach the rural areas; the hierarchical structure
of the Basic Democracies, from the village to Division, with peoples and
government's representatives sitting side by side, form a good two-way
communication channel, where interest articulation can take place. Fur-
ther, Basic Democracy Councils help bring governmental and political
processes closer to the villagers and enable them to participate in
them. These functions, alone, would appear to justify the continuing
existence of some form of the Basic Democracies system in the country.
APPENDIX A
(Letter of Akhter Hameed Khan to Author)
PAKISTAN ACADEMY FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT.
Kotbari, Comilla, East Pakistan, Phone—2102
No. 443 August 7, 196S.
Mr. Ghulam Sarwar Jatoi
Department of Political Science
Kansas jtate University
Manhattan, Kansas 66502
U.S.A.
Dear Mr. Jatoi:
Here are the answers to your questions:
1. The Comilla type co-operatives have been reproduced in 7 more
thanas of Comilla district since 1965. From October 196S the
remaining 13 thanas of the Comilla district will be covered.
Besides, the thanas of Gouripore in Mymensingh district,
Gaibandha in Rangpur district and Natore in Rajshahi district
have similar co-operatives since 1963. The Sub-Division of
Thakurgaon in Dinajpur district has Comilla type village
co-operatives and central associations in several thanas
where tubewells have been sunk by EPWAPDA.
A central association and village co-operatives have also been
introduced in Kashimpur Agricultural Development Estate of the
East Pakistan Agricultural Development Corporation.
2. As regards your question about the role of Union Councils:
The Union Councils have very definite functions of their own
in respect of roads, drainage and many welfare activities.
The co-operative system begins with a village organisation
which is supported by a Thana Central Co-operative Association,
The Union Councils are not directly involved in the credit,
mechanization and marketing programmes of the co-operatives.
Indirectly they render great help through the development of
the roads, drainage and irrigation.
Yours Sincerely,
(Akhter Hameed Khan)
Director
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One of the difficult problems faced by the developing countries is
the question of "building" and "modernizing" a nation, out of diverse
caste, regional and provincial groups.
Three models of nation building have gained prominence in the
developing countries. These models are: dictatorial revolutionary
regime such as that of Nasser in Egypt, mass mobilizing model, such as
in Tanzania and bureaucratic model, such as in Pakistan under Ayub Khan.
This paper is a case study of Ayub regime's effort to carry out moderni-
zation process in the rural areas of one of the two provinces of Pakistan-
East Pakistan.
In this paper, an attempt is made to find out how far Basic Democracy
Councils, have helped in changing the traditional methods of agriculture
in East Pakistan. In this paper, it is maintained that agriculture is
not only a profession but also a way of life for millions of people.
Therefore, by seeking a change in agricultural methods, one is also
attempting to create a change orientated society.
It. was found that East Pakistan was facing tremendous agricultural
problems, which required massive and realistic response from the govern-
ment. The Government of East akistan is trying to meet tha challenge
of agricultural development by various methods and means. A new com-
prehensive cooperative scheme, known as "Comilla Approach" has been
.initiated in East Pakistan, which if carried through properly can be of
a great help to agriculture in ilast Pakistan.
Though Basic Democracies, through the Works Program hava , indirectly
contributed towards agricultural development their overall and direct
aid to agricultural development has been little. Because the problems
of agricultural development in East Pakistan are so massive and critical
that Basic Democracy Councils have not and shouH not be expected to
take full burden of agricultural development in East Pakistan. Their
contribution to agricultural development would probably continue to be
a marginal one.
